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       For the chapter 2, I find that a CEO’s characteristics will have direct impact on the 
occurrence of a firm’s product recall. I also find that various corporate governances 
mechanisms can effectively mitigate/control the negative impact of CEO’s characteristics on 
the likelihood of product recall events. For the chapter 3, I investigate the impact of PHC on 
firms’ financial reporting policy. I find evidence that firms experiencing a product harm crisis 
engage in income-increasing earnings management, and the upward earning management is 
positively associated with the severity of the product harm crisis. Moreover, income-increasing 
earnings management is most prominent for crisis firms that produce durable goods, have 
industrial customers, and have CEOs who possess greater equity incentive and who are earlier 
in their tenure. Furthermore, upward earnings management helps firms retain major customers 
and reduces the propensity of a bonus cut and forced turnover for the CEO. For the chapter 4, 
I study debt market reaction to the announcements of recall firms. I find that banks charge 19% 
higher interest spreads on loans to recall firms after product recall announcements. In addition, 
banks monitor recall firms more closely by using tighter non-price terms I further find that the 
effects of product recall on debt contracting are more pronounced for firms with less 
independent board of directors, lower ex-ante ability to recover from product recalls, and with 
multiple product recalls. Taken as a whole, my findings suggest that banks, as informed 
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Chapter 1:  Introduction   
 
     A product-harm crisis (such as product recall with serious impact) is defined as a well-
publicized event whereby a firm's product fails to fulfill a mandatory safety standard or is found 
to be defective, posing a threat to cause substantial harm, serious injury, or death to consumers 
(Dawar & Pillutla, 2000; Siomkos & Kurzbard,1994). When a product harm crisis occurs, it 
typically results in a product recall.  Previous studies document that firms facing a product 
harm crisis incur short-term cost associated with handling product recalls (Wynne and Hoffer 
1976, Crafton et al. 1981, Reilly and Hoffer 1983, Rhee and Haunschild 2006, Van Heerde et 
al. 2007, Zhao et al. 2011, Van Heerde et al. 2013). More importantly, product harm crises 
potentially impair firms' intangible assets such as brand value, reputation and customer 
confidence (e.g., Dawar & Lei, 2009; Dawar & Pillutla, 2000; Van Heerde, Helsen & Dekimpe, 
2007), marketing effectiveness (Van Heerde et al. 2007, Cleeren et al. 2013, Rubel et al. 2011), 
stock market performance (Jarrell and Peltzman 1985, Hoffer et al. 1988, Thirumalai and Sinha 
2011, Chen et al. 2009, Yun et al. 2014). Moreover, the advent of one crisis suggests that the 
future incidence of a product harm crisis is more likely (Kalaignanam et al. 2013). To respond 
to the damages caused by a product harm crisis, firms  take actions to minimize the crisis' 
costs such as being more aggressive in advertisements or recall strategies (e.g., Chen, Ganesan, 
& Liu, 2009; Cleeren, van Heerde, & Dekimpe, 2013; Dutta & Pullig, 2011; Siomkos & 
Kurzbard, 1994; Lee et al 2015). In the following dissertation, I attempt to extend the literature 
by investigating the determinants of product harm crises from a corporate governance 
perspective as well as the consequences of product harm crises from earnings management and 
debt contracting perspectives.  
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         While most previous studies focus on the consequence of product harm crises and 
the strategies firms adopt to mitigate their negative impact, very few studies investigate their 
determinants. Despite their worldwide occurrence, knowledge about product harm crisis events 
is still limited regarding why certain firms encounter such crises more often than others 
(Wowak et al. 2015). In order to shed light on this puzzle, I attempt to investigate the 
determinants of product harm crises in the first essay of my dissertation. I adopt a 
configurational perspective (Busenbark, Krause, Boivie, & Graffin, 2015) to analyze how chief 
executive officer (CEO) affects the likelihood that a firm experiences a product harm crisis 
(PHC). 
Specifically, a configurational perspective uses three interrelated but independent 
domains: The Person (e.g., CEO personality and characteristics), The Position (e.g., corporate 
governance mechanisms), and the Environment (e.g., external markets condition and 
performance attribution) (Busenbark, Krause, Boivie, & Graffin, 2015). A configurational 
perspective generates a more comprehensive picture of the influence of CEOs on firm decisions 
and performance outcomes (i.e., Product Harm Crisis). Grounded in the upper echelons theory, 
that a CEO’s psychological property in risk taking will increase a firm’s PHC likelihood but 
such association is mitigated/nullified by the CEO’s rich operational experience. Drawing upon 
agency theory, I then predict that corporate governance provides an effective mechanism to 
constrain a CEO's inappropriate risk-taking so that the PHC likelihood of an inexperienced 
risk-seeking CEO is attenuated when directors have related expertise to fill up the vacuum in 
the CEO's background. Empirical findings are consistent with the hypothesis that directors with 
industry expertise can alleviate the positive association between the incidence of a product 
harm crisis and a risk-taking CEO lacking operational experience. Further, I find that product 
market competition facilitates product quality improvement and the PHC likelihood of a risk-
seeking CEO is lower when the market competition is high. 
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 Regarding the consequences of a product harm crisis, prior research mainly focuses on 
firms' reactions regarding more aggressive marketing. Nevertheless, as a significant corporate 
event, product harm crises can have considerable effects on corporate accounting practices. 
Besides, despite the various costs associated with product harm crises, anecdotal evidence often 
shows that firms usually report strong financial performance in the crisis year. In the second 
essay of my dissertation, I endeavor to provide empirical evidence on such effects. Specifically, 
I try to answer the main question: Does a firm engage in more earnings management when 
facing a product harm crisis?  
     One the one hand, a product harm crisis severally damages a firm's reputation concerning 
its product quality and its reputation to fulfill its implicit contracts with suppliers and customers 
(Cornell and Shapiro 1987; Devin and Halpern 2001). Therefore, managers faced with a 
product harm crisis have strong incentives to manipulate earnings upward to improve 
customers' perception of firm's future ability to fulfill its customers' implicit claims (Bowen et 
al. 1995). In other words, managers have incentives to manipulate earnings to show better 
performance to restore its damaged reputation. Furthermore, related to the above point, since a 
product harm crisis influences sales and revenues, managers faced with such crisis may be 
pressured to manipulate earnings, as they need to make up for a decrease in operational 
performance (Ahmad-Zaluki, Campbell, & Goodacre, 2011), to retain or boost a firm's stock 
price, a key input to their compensation (Charitou, Lambertides, & Trigeorgis, 2007), and to 
lower the likelihood of being fired (Ali and Zhang 2015).  
      On the other hand, a product harm crisis can increase media coverage, which in turn 
increases auditors, creditors and other stakeholder's scrutiny and monitoring over the firm that 
experienced such crisis, resulting in fewer opportunities and higher detections risks for the 
managers to manage earnings (Zavyalova et al. 2012; Francis et al. 2013). Also, managers may 
have the incentive to manipulate earnings downward to take a big bath, or to reduce the 
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financial settlement of the anticipated lawsuit from customers. Thus, it is an empirical question 
as to whether firms increase earnings management in reaction to the product harm crisis.  
       Using a matched sample of U.S. manufacturing firms from 2002 to 2012, I find 
evidence that firms experiencing a product harm crisis engage in income-increasing earnings 
management, and the upward earning management is greater when the severity of the product 
harm crisis get more severe. Moreover, income-increasing earnings management is most 
prominent for crisis firms that produce durable goods, have industrial customers, and have 
CEOs who possess greater equity incentive and who are earlier in their tenure. Furthermore, 
upward earnings management helps firms retain major customers and reduces the propensity 
of a bonus cut and forced turnover for the CEO.  
      In my third essay, I study the effect of product recall events on the contracting terms 
for new bank loans. Unlike a product harm crisis which causes severe damage to customers, 
such as injuries, sickness, or even death, and then receives high levels of publicity in the press, 
a product recall with small-scale may receive scant attention. For example, a product recall 
may be caused by small glitches such as labeling errors, package errors, or design defaults. 
Thus, a product recall is more general and prevalent than an extreme case such as a product 
harm crisis. Prior studies on the consequence of product recall focus on equity investors' 
reaction to product recall events (i.e., Kini et al. 2016). Nevertheless, it is unknown whether 
banks react to the product recall event. I attempt to fill this void in the literature by investigating 
whether and how banks react to firm's product recalls. The question is important for two 
reasons: Firstly, prior studies find mixed finding regarding the market reaction to product recall 
announcement in aggregate. Secondly, bank loans are essential for the ongoing operations of 
most firms. Thus, investigating bank loan contracting can provide further evidence on the 
financial costs of product recalls.      
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       There are three arguments supporting the view that banks are concerned about product 
recalls in aggregate, which would underlie their negative impact on firms' loan contracting. 
Firstly, firms experiencing a product recall incur direct costs such as short-term revenue and 
cash flow reductions, thus increasing their downside risk/default risk (Hendricks and Singhal 
2003). Secondly, a product recall may have a negative impact on a firm's reputation, and brand 
value, thus influencing its cost of debt (Himme et al. 2014, Anginer 2015). Finally, a product 
recall reveals managers' excessive risk-taking personalities, and lack of experience, both of 
which increase the level of operating risk (Wowak et al. 2015B; Marucheck, Greis, Mena, and 
Cai 2011; Ryu 2012).  
        However, there are some counter arguments that banks may not be particularly 
concerned about product recalls in aggregate. Firstly, product recalls are increasingly frequent 
these days due to more stringent regulations, globalized and complicated production processes, 
growing consumers' awareness, and increasing product market competition. It becomes very 
costly for firms to completely prevent the occurrence of product recalls (Thirumalai and Sinha 
2013) Bromiley and Marcus (1989) found decreases in shareholder value to be an insufficient 
deterrent to behavior that may lead to recalls, and that in some cases, it was profitable to 
produce unsafe products because new product brought speedily on the product market can 
generate sales. Secondly, when faced up with product recalls, firms take various actions to 
rescue their reputation and to minimize the negative impact of product recalls. Thirdly, 
consumers forget about product failure events several months later (Vassilikopoulou et al. 
2009).       
         Using hand-collected data on product recall events from the websites of the Food 
and Drug Administration (FDA) and of the Consumer Product Safety Commission(CPSC), I 
find that recall firms pay 38 basis points (0.38%) more in cost of bank loan(otherwise known 
as the yield spread over the risk-free rate) than firms not subject to recalls. Using the average 
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bank loan facility outstanding as a benchmark, such higher yield spread translates into an 
increase of $1.2 million in interest costs. Also, banks monitor such recall firms more closely 
by using tighter non-price terms. The results are robust after correcting for possible 
endogeneity issues using the propensity score matching approach. I further find that the effects 
of the product recall on debt contracting are more pronounced for firms with a less independent 
board of directors, lower ex-ante ability to recover from product recalls, and with multiple 
product recalls. Finally, I do not find banks react to the announcements of product recalls in 
the medical device industry in which product recalls are considered as relatively common 
events. Taken as a whole, my findings suggest that banks, as informed stakeholders, generally 
perceive product recalls as a credit risk factor and react to this risk in debt contracting. 
         The rest of the dissertation is organized as follows: Chapter 2. CEO Characteristics 
and Product Harm Crisis. Chapter 3. Damage Control: Earnings Management in the Face of 
Product Harm Crises.  Chapter 4. Do Bank Price the Product Failure in Debt Contracting? 












































           A substantial body of research has studied the influence of CEOs on firm 
decisions and performance outcomes (Barnard, 1938; Lieberson & O’Connor, 1972; Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976; Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1987; Hoskisson, Castleton, & Withers, 2009; 
Boivie, Lange, McDonald, & Westphal, 2011). The concepts discussed in the literature pertain 
to three interrelated but independent domains: the person (e.g., CEO personality and 
characteristics), the position (e.g., corporate governance), and the environment (e.g., external 
markets condition and performance attribution) (Busenbark, Krause, Boivie, & Graffin, 2015). 
However, prior literature often narrowly focuses on a single domain and generates predictions 
in “a fragmentation” (Busenbark et al., 2015, p.235). In this study, I employ a configurational 
perspective proposed by Busenbark et al. (2015) to explore how CEOs influence an important 
firm performance outcome: incidences of product harm crises (PHCs).  
  PHCs are defined as publicized events whereby a firm's product is reported as being 
defective or failing to fulfill a mandatory safety standard, and they often result in huge losses 
of firm value (Dawar & Pillutla, 2000; Van Heerde, Helsen, & Dekimpe, 2007; Gao, Xie, Wang, 
& Wilbur, 2015). Given the ensuing media attention and public discussion on product security 
issues, there is a recent call for more studies on how to effectively reduce PHC incidences 
(Wowak & Boone, 2015). I respond to the call and study how CEOs’ characteristics (“the 
person”), corporate governance (“the position”), and external environment (“the environment”) 
interplay to affect the likelihood of PHCs.  
 I first focus on two important individual-CEO characteristics: risk-seeking 
personality 1  and experiences in managing operational issues. Upper echelons theory 
(Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1990, 1996) suggests that a CEO’s psychological attributes have 
significant implications on firm strategic decisions (Carpenter, Geletkanycz, & Sanders, 2004; 
                                               
1 CEO risk-taking personality and CEO risk-seeking preferences are interchangeable terms in this study. 
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Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007; Hoskisson, Chirico, Zyung, & Gambeta, 2017; Gamache, 
McNamara, Mannor, & Johnson, 2015). A CEO’s risk-seeking personality might be related to 
a higher likelihood of PHCs due to the CEO’s higher tolerance to potential risks at production. 
Literature also shows that what a CEO has done in the past shapes who he is and influences the 
decisions he makes (e.g., Daily, Certo & Dalton, 2000; Guthrie & Datta, 1997). I argue that a 
CEO’s operational experiences will mitigate the PHC hazards associated with his risk-taking 
preference as CEOs who have abundant experiences in operations will be alert to product 
quality issues and take measures to mitigate the risks. 
I next investigate how “the position” of a CEO influences the relation between CEO 
risk-taking personality and PHCs. Corporate governance represents an important control 
system that relates to “the position” of a CEO (Abernethy, Kuang & Qin, 2015). Board of 
directors (BOD), an essential component of corporate governance, likely affects the relation 
between CEO risk-taking and PHC likelihood as a principal mission of the BOD is to control 
unwanted managerial risk-taking (Westphal & Fredrickson, 2001; Hoskisson, et al., 2009; 
Cassar 2014; Kor & Sundaramurthy, 2009). I expect that the role of a BOD becomes 
particularly important when the CEO has a high-risk appetite but lacks operational experiences.  
Concerning the influence from “the environment” in which the CEO operates, product 
market competition is an important external market condition that may influence the relation 
between CEO risk-taking personality and PHC incidents (Kranton & Minehart, 2001; Ryu, 
2012). Competitions impose firms and their CEOs under direct pressure as firms providing 
inferior quality of products or services will suffer reputational loss and liquidation risk (Dawar 
& Pillutla, 2000; Kageyama, 2006; Baggs & Bettignies, 2007; Chan, Li, & Pierce, 2014). I 
expect that competition and market pressure will motivate a risk-seeking CEO to carefully 
assess the implications of his decisions on product quality, thereby alleviating the relation 
between the CEO’s risk-taking personality and the PHC likelihood.  
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Using a sample of manufacturing firms in the United States from 2002 to 2012, I find 
that a CEO’s risk-taking personality is associated with a higher PHC hazard only when he lacks 
operational experience. I further show that a BOD’s industry experience significantly alleviates 
the likelihood of PHCs when the risk-seeking CEO lacks functional background in operations, 
supportive of the monitoring and advisory role of BODs documented in the prior literature 
(Berle & Means, 1932; Fama & Jensen, 1983; Abernethy et al., 2015). Finally, as predicted, 
risk-seeking CEOs have a lower PHC likelihood when industry competition intensifies, 
consistent with the view that external environment significantly affects CEOs’ decision making 
and their firms’ performance outcomes (Busenbark et al., 2015). 
My findings make several contributions to the existing literature. First, I expand the 
research on how CEO characteristics affect firm performance (Busenbark et al., 2015). I 
demonstrate that factors related to a CEO’s personal characteristics (e.g., risk-taking 
personality and functional background in operations), his position (e.g., corporate governance), 
and the environment (e.g., industry competition) interact, and it is their confluence that explains 
a firm’s operational performance. My model thus facilitates a more comprehensive 
understanding of how strategic leaders of a firm affect firm behavior and how corporate control 
mechanisms and external factors influence the process. 
One challenge in the literature is to capture CEOs’ psychological attributes using 
observable data (Lawrence, 1997; Hambrick, 2007). I employ an innovative approach and infer 
CEOs’ risk-taking personality from their off-the-job behavior. More specifically, I use a CEO’s 
hobby of flying airplanes as an observable indicator for his values and cognitive model toward 
risks (Zuckerman, 1971; Zuckerman, Eysenck, & Eysenck, 1978; Cain & McKeon, 2016; 
Sunder, Sunder, & Zhang, 2016). My method helps infer an important CEO characteristic 
which is often unobservable. 
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I also extend the scarce literature on product-related controversies. My study relates to 
Wowak, Mannor, & Wowak (2015) that investigates the effects of CEO compensation on the 
incidences of product safety problems, as I both reveal one undesired consequence of CEOs’ 
aggressive risk-taking; yet the two studies differ in several important ways. Firstly, while 
Wowak et al. (2015) focus on how compensation design functions as a powerful mechanism to 
guide CEOs’ behavior, I examine how heterogeneity among individual CEOs in their innate 
values and cognitive styles implicates their actions. From this aspect, Wowak et al. (2015) 
study the ‘wealth effect’; I, in contrast, investigate a ‘risk aversion effect’2 on CEO behavior 
(Cain & McKeon, 2016). To my best knowledge, my study is among the first studies to 
illustrate that a CEO’s personality, interacting with his experiences, can influence product 
quality and it is the joint force of a CEO’s individual characteristics, corporate governance, and 
market competition that has an impact on product safety issues.  
 
2.2 Theoretical framework, related literature, and hypothesis development 
            Emphasizing the unique, embedded situation of CEOs, Busenbark et al. (2015) 
propose a configurational perspective in analyzing CEO-related issues. This perspective posits 
that a CEO’s influence on corporate decisions can be explained by three interdependent 
domains: “the person”, “the position”, and “the environment”, in which “the person” relates to 
personal characteristics of a CEO, such as the CEO’s personality and background; “the position” 
refers to factors that relate to the role and structure of the CEO’s job, such as corporate 
governance mechanisms that monitor the CEO’s behavior; and “the environment” is the 
external environment in which the CEO operates, such as industry conditions and external 
pressure. 3  I adopt this configurational perspective to explore how a CEO’s individual 
                                               
2 My findings suggest that a CEO’s risk-seeking personality (or individual characteristics on risk aversion) has 
direct implications on his behavior, which stays significant after controlling for the ‘wealth effects’ as documented 
in prior literature. 
3 Busenbark et al. (2015) argue that the three domains are interdependent and jointly describe how factors 
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characteristics, corporate governance, and market competition interplay in explaining a firm’s 
PHC likelihood.  
 
2.2.1 “The Person”: CEO Risk-taking Personality and Functional Background  
            The influence of CEOs’ personal characteristics on firm performance is 
proposed by upper echelons theory that argues that organizational actions and performance 
outcomes are determined by managerial human attributes (Hambrick & Mason 1984; 
Chatterjee & Hambrick 2007; Hambrick 2007). Empirical evidence supports the effects of 
various dimensions of a CEO’s attributes on firm decisions, including narcissism (Chatterjee 
& Hambrick, 2007), regulatory focus (Gamache et al., 2015), affection and emotions (Roth, 
1995; Delgado-Garcia and La Fuente-Sabate, 2010), hubris (Tang, Qian, Chen, & Shen, 2015; 
Cormier, Lapointe-Antunes, & Magnan 2015), and personality (Herrmann & Nadkarni, 2014). 
In this study, I focus on two fundamental characteristics of a CEO: risk-taking personality and 
functional background (Hambrick & Mason 1984; Hambrick, 2007). A CEO’s risk-taking 
preference represents his cognitive base, value, and perception, which ultimately influences a 
wide range of strategic choices made in a firm. Similarly, a CEO’s functional background 
orients the way he tackles the current problems and significantly influences the CEO’s goal 
selection, time range, problem definition, information processing, and strategic choices 
(Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967; Walsh, 1988; Slater and Dixon-Flowler, 2009). Both may have 
significant impacts on a firm’s performance outcomes.  
A higher likelihood of PHCs may be associated with a CEO’s risk-taking personality 
as the CEO has high-risk tolerance and may ignore potential risks in the current production 
process and inspection system, which can grow into severe production problems at a later stage 
                                               
pertaining to a CEO explain firm decisions and performance outcomes. The configurational perspective integrates 
various theories and represents a framework that provides new contingencies in understanding economic 
consequences of a CEO’s individual characteristics. 
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(Kimes, 2010; Marucheck, Greis, Mena, & Cai, 2011; Wowak et al., 2015; Lee, 2016). I 
formally state in my first hypothesis that: 
H1: A CEO’s risk-taking personality is positively associated with the occurrence of 
PHCs. 
However, to survive and thrive in a dynamic business environment CEOs inevitably 
need to take risks and their personal traits in risk-taking are potentially valuable to improve the 
competitive advantage of their firms (Hoskisson et al., 2017; Cain & Mckeon, 2016). I 
acknowledge the incremental value of a CEO’s risk-taking personality and consider that it 
introduces a plausible tension to my first hypothesis. 
While it is plausible that PHCs are more likely when a CEO is innately risk-taking, the 
CEO’s prior experiences in operational management will help alleviate product-related issues 
arising from his risk-taking personality. CEOs with experiences in production and operations 
likely possess a clear vision on the strategic importance of achieving superior product quality 
at risk-taking (McGill, Slocum, & Lei, 1992; Raisch & Birkinshaw, 2008). For example, they 
will plan production and propose new techniques with greater prudence; they are also able to 
resolve potential product quality issues in an efficient way (Kalyanaram, Robinson, & Urban, 
1995; Ryu, 2012; Hendricks, et al., 2014; McCann, 2014). In contrast, in the absence of 
operational experiences, CEOs likely pursue risk in a discretionary way and their risk-taking 
behavior might be merely personal interests or heuristics driven without in-depth analysis or 
prudent planning, leading to a higher hazard of PHCs (Shetty, 1987). 
In sum, I expect that a CEO’s risk-taking personality will interact with his functional 
background in operations to influence the occurrence of PHCs. That is, the CEO’s operational 
experiences will mitigate the association between his risk-taking personality and the likelihood 
of PHCs. Hence, I hypothesize that:  
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H2: A CEO’s operational experiences will attenuate the association between the 
CEO’s risk-taking personality and the occurrence of PHCs. 
 
2.2.2 “The Position”: Expertise of BOD 
            Prior literature applying agency theory shows that a BOD, an important 
component of corporate governance that relates to “the position” of a CEO, represents an 
effective control mechanism that influences the whole process of a firm’s decision making 
(Plöckinger, Aschaer, Hiebl, & Rohatschek, 2016; Abernethy et al., 2015; Abernethy & Wallis, 
2017). BODs constrain managerial opportunism, including inappropriate risk-taking, and play 
a primary advisory role in making important corporate decisions. Evidence shows that directors 
bring external resources to the focal firm such as suppliers of inputs, knowledge of production, 
etc., and directors’ expertise and experiences are pivotal in evaluating feasibility of the firm’s 
strategies, detecting initial signs of risks and errors, and implementing necessary measures to 
prevent the occurrence of severe malpractices in the firm (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Pfeffer & 
Salancik 1978; Intintoli, Kahle, & Zhao, 2016; Omer, Shelley, & Tice, 2016). 
I expect that the expertise of a BOD is particularly important when the risk-taking CEO 
lacks experiences in operations and manufacturing. For example, directors’ industry-specific 
experience allows them to access most relevant and accurate information so that they will 
provide valuable advice on how to improve production quality and ensure the effectiveness of 
current quality control system, especially when their CEO lacks related information or 
resources (Hillman, Withers, & Collins, 2009; Cassar, 2014). Prior literature indicates that 
directors’ industry expertise helps them swiftly identify and acquire critical resources, such as 
global suppliers and local distributors, in the implementation of quality control (Kor & 
Sundaramurthy, 2009; Dalziel, Gentry, & Bowerman, 2011; Barroso, Villegas, & Pérez-Calero, 
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2011; Guldiken & Darendeli, 2016). 4  Therefore, I expect that a BOD’s expertise is of 
importance to fill a void in a CEO’s experience so that the negative effect of the CEO’s risk-
taking on product quality is mitigated. Formally stated, my hypothesis is that: 
   H3: BOD’s expertise will attenuate the association between risk-taking personality 
of a CEO who lacks operational experiences and the occurrence of PHCs.  
 
2.2.3 “The Environment”: Product Market Competition 
            “The environment” domain in the configurational perspective relates to the 
contextual factors of the environment in which a firm operates. I focus on product market 
competition as it is a key factor that influences firm decisions and performance outcomes 
(Shetty 1987; Kroll, Wright, & Heiens 1999; Rust, Zahorik, & Keiningham 1995).  
Product market competition imposes CEOs under pressure and introduces the threat of 
liquidation (Hart 1983; Hermalin 1992; Schmidt 1997). Evidence shows that firms and CEOs 
providing poor-quality products are subject to adverse consequences, ranging from reputational 
damage and financial losses to heightened litigation risk and increased bankruptcy probabilities 
(Dawar & Pillutla, 2000; Kageyama & Tokunaga, 2006; Baggs & Bettignies, 2007; Chan, Li, 
& Pierce, 2014). In contrast, by improving product quality firms are gaining market shares, 
financial profits, and competitive advantages compared to their rivals (Shetty, 1987; Rust, 
Zahorik, & Keiningham, 1995; Kroll, Wright, & Heiens, 1999). It argues that market 
competition has a positive effect on product quality as both firms and their CEOs who perceive 
the threat of market competition will value product quality with greater importance (Baggs & 
Bettignies 2007).5 Evidence indeed shows that under industry competition firms are more 
                                               
4 Problems related to supplier firms’ products and distribution process are a major factor of product quality 
failure (Marucheck et al., 2011). For example, Fords reported that 76% of the company’s product quality 
problems stem from its first-tier suppliers (Sherefkin 2002). 
5 Compared to monopoly markets where the market structure includes a sole seller and goods of the seller faces 
no close substitutes, competitive markets are more likely to generate product quality close to a socially optimal 
level (Spence, 1975). The reason is that market competition will impose a direct pressure on firms to improve 
16 
 
likely to take measures, such as adopting ISO 9000, to improve the quality of production and 
higher product quality is often observed when the competition increases in the industry 
(Cotterill, 1999; Baggs, 2007; Cao & Prakash, 2011; Matsa, 2011).  
Risk-taking CEOs are responsive to the dynamics of the markets (Davidson et al., 2015; 
Bernile et al., 2017; Cain & McKeon, 2016; Faccio et al., 2016). I expect that, bearing market 
competition in mind, risk-taking CEOs will become more cautious in their risk-taking 
initiatives when competition intensifies and hence improve their prudence in operational 
management to avoid providing inferior quality products. Therefore, increased product market 
competition will lower the likelihood of PHCs in firms led by risk-taking CEOs. My hypothesis 
is formally stated as follows: 
  H4: Industry competition will attenuate the association between a CEO’s risk-taking 
personality and the occurrence of PHCs. 
Figure 1 graphically presents my theoretical framework that explains how CEO 
personality, corporate governance, and market competition interact in affecting the PHC 
incidences. 
 
2.3 Empirical Measurements, Models, and Sample 
2.3.1  Key Variable Measurement 
Product Harm Crises. My dependent variable is the occurrence of PHCs. I create a 
dummy variable PHC that equals one if a firm has a product harm crisis in a year, and zero 
otherwise. I use the product concern indicator in MSCI ESG KLD STATS (KLD) database to 
                                               
production quality as poor quality of products or services will be quickly identified and penalized by their 
customers, suppliers, and competitors (Baggs & Bettignies, 2007). The liquidation argument further suggests that 
under the market competition CEOs are particularly concerned about the security of their job and thus motivated 
to devote more efforts to quality control (Hermalin, 1992; Schmidt, 1997; Baggs & Bettignies, 2007). Then a 
higher level of product quality is expected with the increase of market competition. Further, evidence shows that 
prioritizing financial profitability at the expense of product quality (by cutting internal costs in product testing) 




infer whether a firm experiences a PHC in a year, which is “designed to assess the severity of 
controversies related to the quality and safety of a firm’s products and services” (MSCI, 
2015).6 The reliability of using the KLD product concern variable as an indicator of PHCs 
has been validated in prior literature (Kashmiri & Brower, 2016).7  
CEO’s Risk-taking personality. I infer a CEO’s risk-taking personality (i.e., his risk-
seeking preferences) from his observable characteristics, i.e., whether he obtains an airman 
certificate. A CEO’s hobby of flying airplanes provides an observable indicator of the CEO’s 
preferences for bearing non-pecuniary (i.e., health) risks as well as his innate desire for thrill 
and adventure seeking (Zuckerman, 1971; Zuckerman et al., 1978). Evidence shows that 
CEOs who hold airmen licenses have a high value in aggressively pursuing risky initiatives 
and that firms led by pilot CEOs are associated with more pronounced corporate risk-taking 
(Cain & McKeon, 2016; Sunder et al., 2016)8. 
I search the website of Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)9 to identify whether a 
CEO has a pilot credential. For accuracy, I use both CEOs’ names and dates of birth as primary 
filters in the search, where CEOs’ names are retrieved from ExecuComp and information on 
CEOs’ dates of birth is manually collected from Bloomberg. An indicator variable PILOT is 
created to flag whether a CEO has a pilot credential. 
                                               
6 Factors affecting this evaluation include, but are not limited to, a history of involvement in product safety-
related legal cases, widespread or egregious instances of recalls or fines due to defective or unsafe products and 
services, resistance to improved practices, and criticism by Non-Governmental Organization (NGOs) and/or other 
third-party observers. 
7 Kashmiri and Brower (2016) independently code the events related to PHCs based on articles, press release, 
and reports on product recalls, as well as product-related litigation and compensatory damages. They find that 
the hand-collected data match the product concern variable in the KLD product category.  
8  Cain and McKeon (2016) has validated/tested the CEO’s hobby of flying airplanes as a valid risk-taking 
persomality measure in a wide range of firms’ policies led by the CEO. However, Sunder et al (2016) argue that 
CEO’s hobby of flying airplanes mostly capture the sensation/innovation seeking personality. Although 
sensation/innovation seeking personality are highly correlated with risk-taking behaviors (Zuckerman 1971), I 
acknowledge the possibility of sensation seeking personality can be an alternative channel to influence the 
resulting product harm crisis.  
9 FAA stores and releases the names, certificate levels, and rating information for all pilots in the United States. 
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   CEO’s operational experiences. I consider a CEO knowledgeable in production and 
operational matters if he used to serve as a chief operating officer (COO) before the current 
CEO position. A COO has a full plate of responsibilities in overseeing operations, product 
manufacturing, procurement, and transportation, each of which has a direct implication to 
production and quality control (Davis, Aquilano, & Balakrishnan, 2005; Marucheck et al., 2011; 
Hendricks, Hora, & Singhal, 2014; Wowak & Boone, 2015). I search Bloomberg, Factiva, and 
companies’ websites to obtain information on a CEO’s employment history. Variable CEOEXP 
equals one if a CEO has prior COO experience (in the current firm or elsewhere), and zero 
otherwise. 
BOD’s expertise. Prior studies show that quality of corporate governance improves 
with industry-specific experiences of directors (Cassar, 2014; Kor & Sundaramurthy, 2009; 
Guldiken & Darendeli, 2016). I use independent directors’ expertise in the industry where 
their firm operates as a proxy for the BOD’s expertise. Directors accumulate industry 
knowledge and improve their supervision capability by serving multiple directorships in 
various firms of the same industry (Wang, Xie, & Zhu, 2015). An independent director is 
considered to have industry expertise if in recent four years he has served a primary position 
(such as an executive and director) in another firm that operates in the same industry as the 
focal firm. BODEXP captures overall industry expertise of independent directors on board, 
defined as the percentage of independent directors on board who have industry expertise. 
Market competition. I measure market competition of an industry by Herfindahl index 
(Petersen & Rajan, 1995). Specifically, for each industry-year, I include all firms with non-
missing sales in Compustat in calculating the Herfindahl index, where the industry is defined 
by the first two-digits SIC code. A smaller value of Herfindahl index indicates higher 
competition in the industry. I then create an indicator variable INDCOM that equals one for 
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industries with high market competition, and zero otherwise, benchmarking upon whether the 
Herfindahl index of the industry in a year is lower than the sample median.  
Control variables. The inclusion of control variables follows prior literature. Large 
firms and firms with complicated organizational and operational structures might be more 
likely to experience PHCs (Kashmir et al., 2016; Wowak & Boone, 2015; Wowak et al., 
2015). I include SIZE measured by the natural logarithm of total sales, and SEG, defined as 
the number of business segments. Firms in financial losses may have constrained resources to 
invest in improving product quality (Kini, Shenoy, & Subramaniam, 2017), but they may also 
have stronger incentives to provide high product quality to reduce the liquidation risk. I 
include LOSS, an indicator for a firm experiencing financial losses in the prior year. I also 
include market-to-book ratio (MTB) to control for the possibility that firms with better 
prospects will invest more in product-related initiatives. Further, I control for a firm’s capital 
structure by debt ratio (LEV) and institutional ownership (IO), as debtholders and 
shareholders are concerned about product quality and may act on it (Lee & Park, 2009). 
CEOs’ characteristics, other than their risk-taking preferences, may also affect firms’ 
production policies and product quality (Tang, Li, & Yang, 2015). A CEO’s age (AGE) and 
tenure (TENURE) are controlled for. Older CEOs might be more conservative (Serfling, 2014; 
Andreou, Louca, & Petrou, 2017), potentially contributing to improved product quality; but 
they might also be inclined to take more risk due to limited horizon (Matta & Beamish, 2008; 
Galasso & Simcoe, 2011; Yim, 2013), yielding a positive effect on PHC incidences. Similarly, 
although longer-tenured CEOs might be entrenched (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1989) and hence 
increases PHC hazards, firm-specific knowledge accrued over a CEO’s tenure may facilitate 
his quick identification of potential issues in operations (Henderson, Miller, & Hambrick, 2006; 
Hambrick, 2007; Crook, Ketchen, Combs, & Todd, 2008). I also control for CEO power over 
the board by including a CEO-Chair indicator (DUALITY), board size (BODSIZE), and board 
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independence (BODINDE) (Abernethy et al., 2015). I further include CEO option 
compensation (OPTION) measured as the natural logarithm of the value of unexercised 
exercisable options to control for the risk-taking effects from CEO compensation (Wowak et 
al., 2015).10  Finally, I include industry and year fixed effects. An appendix presents the 
definitions of all variables. 
 
2.3.2 Sample and Data Sources 
        My sample is constructed by merging various data sources. PHC data are retrieved 
from the product quality concern indicator in the KLD database. I merge KLD with Compustat 
for financial information and with ExecuComp and BoardEx for information on corporate 
governance, director experiences, and CEO characteristics. I follow the literature and retain 
only manufacturing firms (i.e., two-digit SIC code 20-39) (Dawar & Pillutla, 2000; Ryu 2012; 
Wowak & Boone, 2015; Wowak et al., 2015). I then merge the sample with my hand-collected 
data on CEOs’ pilot credential information and functional background in operations. My final 
sample consists of 3,114 firm-year observations for years 2002 to 2012.  
 
2.3.3 Empirical Models 
        I employ logistic regressions as my dependent variable is a PHC indicator.11 To 
test H1 concerning the relationship between a CEO’s risk-taking personality and the 
likelihood of PHCs, I estimate the following Model (1): "#$%("'( = 1) = ,	(α/ + α1"2345 + (465743 + 8)    (1) 
                                               
10 Stock options granted to a CEO may be used as an effective profit- and risk-sharing method to prolong the 
CEO’s horizon and mitigate the agency problem between shareholders and the CEO (Jensen & Murphy; 1990; 
Murphy, 1999; Coles, Daniel, & Naveen, 2006). 
11 Hoetker (2007) shows that extra care should be taken to interpret interaction terms in a non-linear regression, 
such as a logistic regression. It is recommended to provide a graphical presentation of interaction effects. I follow 
the recommendation in Hoetker (2007) and compare coefficients across groups in a plot. Details are discussed 
in empirical result section.   
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Where ε is an error term and CONTROL represents a vector of control variables. A significantly 
positive sign on α1 will suggest that pilot CEOs are associated with an increased hazard of 
PHCs. 
 In H2, I expect that a CEO’s experiences in operations and production will mitigate the 
effect of his risk-taking personality on the PHC likelihood. Model (2) is employed to examine 
the moderating effect: "#$%("'( = 1) = ,	(β/ + β1"2345 + :;(<4<=" + :>"2345 ∗ (<4<=" +(465743 + 	8) (2) 
The coefficient on the interaction term "2345 ∗ (<4<=" captures the moderating effect of 
CEOEXP. I expect that the relation between CEO risk-taking personality and PHC is 
mitigated by the CEO’s prior operational experiences and thus :> will be significantly 
negative.  
 In H3, I predict that BOD’s experiences will help alleviate the PHC hazard of a CEO’s 
risk-taking when the CEO lacks operational experiences. I employ Model (3) as followings: "#$%("'( = 1) = ,	(@/ + γ1"2345 + @;B4C<=" + @>"2345 ∗ B4C<=" +(465743 + 8) (3) 
I form two subsamples based on whether a CEO has or lacks operational experiences and 
estimate Model (3) in the two subsamples, respectively. A significantly negative coefficient 
on "2345 ∗ B4C<=" (@>) in the absence but not the presence of CEO operational 
experiences will be consistent with H3.  
 In H4, I expect that market competition will moderate the association between CEO risk-
taking personality and the PHC likelihood. I estimate Model (4) to examine my expectation:  "#$%("'( = 1) = ,	(D/ + D1"2345 + D;26C(4E + D>"2345 ∗ 26C(4E +(465743 + 8) (4) 
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I expect the coefficient on "2345 ∗ 26C(4E (D>) to be significantly negative as market 
competition weakens the relation between a risk-taking CEO and occurrences of PHCs. In all 
models, I control for industry and year fixed effects and correct standard errors for firm-level 
heterogeneity (Greene, 2012). 
 
2.4 Empirical Results 
2.4.1 Descriptive Statistics and Univariate Analysis 
        Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics of variables used in my analyses. PHCs occur 
in 11% of my observations. About 3% of CEOs in my sample hold an airman license.12 There 
are 57% of the CEOs who have functioned as a COO before being appointed to the CEO 
position. On average, 17% of independent directors on board have served a major role 
elsewhere in the same industry during the most recent four years. An average CEO in my 
sample is about fifty-five years old, and his tenure is 7 years (recall that TENURE is measured 
as natural logarithm of the number of years that a CEO is in position). An average board 
consists of nine directors, mainly independent, and about 26% of the boards are chaired by 
CEOs. In addition, the mean of institutional ownership is 77% as my sample includes many 
large manufacturing firms.  
  Table 2 summarizes Pearson pairwise correlations of the variables used in my 
empirical analyses. The correlation between PILOT and PHC is not significant, thereby 
suggesting that pilot CEOs’ risk-taking personality in itself does not necessarily relate to a 
higher PHC likelihood in the firms that they lead. I notice that PHC and CEOEXP have a 
significantly positive correlation, which suggests that firms subject to a greater PHC hazard 
tend to select CEOs who are experienced in operational management, possibly in an attempt to 
                                               
12 Cain & McKeon (2016) and Sunder et al. (2016) document that 8% of CEOs in the S&P 500 firms hold a private 
pilot license. If I constrain my sample to S&P 500 firms, I get a similar ratio.  
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control the potential risk embedded in business.13 I also notice that several variables associated 
with firm size exhibit relatively high correlations (e.g., SIZE, BODSIZE, and SEG). I check the 
variance inflation factor (VIF) of the variables used in the regressions (including the 
interactions). The maximum VIF is 3.20 and the average VIF is 1.58, both below the cutoff 
threshold of 10 suggested by Kennedy (1992), suggesting that multicollinearity is less likely to 
be an issue in my analysis. 
 
2.4.2 Discussion of Main Results 
            Table 3 reports the empirical results of Models (1) and (2). Column (1) 
summarizes the findings on the relationship between a CEO’s risk-taking personality and PHC 
incidences as hypothesized in H1, and Column (2) presents the results on the moderating effect 
of CEOs’ operational background as expected in H2. Statistics of Chi-squared show that both 
models exhibit significant power in explaining the variation of PHC likelihood among firms. 
In Column (1), the coefficient on PILOT is not statistically significant, suggesting that a CEO’s 
risk-taking preference in itself does not relate to a significantly higher PHC hazard. When the 
interaction term PILOT*CEOEXP is added into the model, results in Column (2) show that the 
coefficient on PILOT becomes significantly positive (β = 1.494, p<0.10), whereas the 
coefficient on the interaction term PILOT*CEOEXP is significantly negative (β = -2.036, p < 
0.05), which suggests that a CEO’s risk-taking personality is significantly associated with an 
increased likelihood of PHCs when the CEO lacks experiences in operational management 
while such association is significantly mitigated in firms where the CEO has prior COO 
experiences. The result is in line with my prediction in H2 that a CEO’s functional background 
in operations mitigates the PHC hazards of his risk-taking personality.  
                                               




 The results of control variables are generally consistent with the prior literature and my 
predictions. Larger firms are subject to a higher PHC likelihood (Kashmir et al., 2016; Wowak 
& Boone, 2015; Wowak et al., 2015). Loss firms are associated with a lower PHC hazard, 
suggesting that these firms take measures to improve product quality in order to prevent 
deterioration of the liquidation risk.14  
Figure 2 provides a graphical illustration on how the effect of a CEO’s risk-taking 
personality on PHC likelihood varies with the CEO’s operational experiences. The slope of the 
line representing the association between CEOEXP and PHC, is flat for PILOT = 0 group, 
while it is highly steep for PILOT = 1 group, which is consistent with my previous findings 
derived from the regression analysis. Therefore, the results of both regression analysis and 
graphical demonstration suggest that a CEO’s operational management experiences are most 
valuable in reducing a firm’s PHC risk when the CEO has high risk-taking personality while 
his experiences have marginal value when the CEO is immune to risk-seeking innately. 
The results of Model (3) are presented in Table 4 where I analyze the moderating effect 
of a BOD’s industry expertise. Chi-squared statistics suggest that the model specification has 
significant power in explaining the variation of the dependent variable. Recall that I expect in 
H3 that directors’ expertise will alleviate the PHC hazards associated with a risk-taking CEO 
when the CEO lacks operational experiences, whereas it is less valuable in the PHC risk 
reduction when their CEO already has abundant experiences in operational management. My 
empirical findings are in line with the expectation. As shown in Table 4, the interaction term 
PILOT*BODEXP is significantly negative (β = -0.201, p < 0.01) only in Column (2) where the 
analysis is performed in a subsample of CEOs without prior COO experiences. The interaction 
                                               
14 I also find that CEO stock option compensation is associated with a lower PHC likelihood, suggesting that CEOs 
tend to increase their prudence over production when they own more stock options, which is consistent with 
prior literature that shows that CEOs’ stock-based compensation will motivate the CEO to take measures to avoid 
product quality failure to maximize shareholders’ value (Kashmir et al., 2016).  
25 
 
term does not show statistical significance in Columns (1) or (3) where either a full sample or 
a subsample of CEOs with COO background is used in the analysis.15 
    My H4 relates to the influence of product market competition. I expect that market 
competition will increase a risk-taking CEO’s prudence over production and reduce the PHC 
hazards related to the CEO’s risk-taking preferences. Table 5 reports the results of Model (4). 
The statistics of Chi-squared demonstrate the satisfactory goodness-of-fitness of my model 
specification. Column (1) summarizes the results using a full sample, where the coefficient on 
the interaction term PILOT*INDCOM is significant and negative (β = -2.244, p < 0.01), 
consistent with my prediction that, with the increase of market competition, CEOs will focus 
more on product quality and hence the influence of a CEO’s risk-taking personality on PHCs 
is attenuated. In Column (2) and (3), I re-estimate Model (1) using a subsample of CEOs having 
prior COO experiences, and a subsample of CEOs without prior COO experiences, respectively. 
The coefficient on the interaction term PILOT*INDCOM remains significant and negative in 
both columns, suggesting that the positive effect of market competition on product quality 
holds for all risk-taking CEOs, regardless of their functional background in operations, as they 
all face the pressure of improving product quality at the markets.16   
 
2.4.3 Robustness Analyses 
          Firms appointing risk-taking CEOs might be fundamentally different from those 
that choose not to do so. One concern is that firms with higher product quality may be the ones 
that select pilot CEOs with abundant operational management experiences. Then the observed 
moderating effects of CEO experiences may merely reflect the selection issue derived from 
CEO appointments. To mitigate this concern, I employ a propensity scoring matching (PSM) 
                                               
15 The reduction in sample size when the model is estimated in subsamples is due to the inclusion of industry 
fixed effects. Some industries are automatically dropped because of perfect prediction in a logistic model. 
16 Graphical analyses provide similar results as the regression analysis, supportive of the moderating effects of 
BODEXP and INDCOM. 
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method to control for observable differences between firms with Pilot CEOs (hereafter 
“treatment firms”) and firms with non-pilot CEOs (hereafter “control firms”). I run a logistic 
regression to model the likelihood of being a treatment firm17 and then obtain the predicted 
likelihood from the regression as a proxy for the propensity of one observation to become a 
treatment firm. I next perform a one-to-one match for each treatment firm, choosing a control 
firm with the closest propensity score to the treatment firm from the same industry-year 
combination and imposing a constraint that the difference between their propensity scores must 
not be larger than 0.10.18 This procedure yields 60 pairs of treatment and control firms (120 
firm-year observations in total). 
Panel A in Table 6 compares covariates balance pre- and post- the PSM. I notice that 
before the matching firms led by pilot CEOs exhibit significant differences from multiple 
dimensions compared to firms of non-pilot CEOs. For example, pilot CEOs’ firms are larger 
in size, higher in leverage and growth; further, the CEO is long-tenured, older in age, with a 
higher likelihood to chair the board, and compensated with more stock options. The cross-
group differences generally disappear in my PSM sample, suggesting that the PSM procedure 
effectively eliminates the likelihood that observable differences related to my variable of 
interest PILOT may provide an alternative explanation to my findings.19  
 Pane B of Table 6 presents the results of Models (1) and (2) using the PSM sample. 
The coefficient on PILOT is not statistically significant in Column (1), consistent with my prior 
findings that a CEO’s risk-taking personality does not necessarily increase a firm’s PHC 
hazards. In Column (2), the coefficient on the main effect of PILOT becomes significantly 
positive whereas the coefficient on the interaction term PILOT*CEOEXP is significantly 
                                               
17 I include a group of variables to predict the likelihood of selecting a pilot CEO, including SIZE, LEV, MTB, LOSS, 
SEG, IO, BODSIZE, and BODINDE. 
18 I also impose common support by dropping treatment firms whose propensity scores are higher than the 
maximum or less than the minimum propensity score of control firms. 
19 The cross-group differences on TENURE and AGE remain statistically significant in the PSM sample. I follow 
Erkens and Bonner (2013) and include all covariates in the comparisons into next step PHC regressions. 
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negative, in line with my expectation that pilot CEOs experienced in production management 
face a lower likelihood of PHCs compared to pilot CEOs who lack such experiences. 
        In addition to PSM, I conduct several other robustness checks. As an alternative way 
to address the endogeneity related to CEO selection, I follow Kim, Wang, & Zhang (2016) and 
remove firms-years when a CEO’s tenure is less than 3 years. To the extent that firm-CEO 
matching effect winds off during a CEO’s tenure, excluding short-tenured CEO-years will 
alleviate the concern of endogeneity due to plausible CEO-firm matching effects. I replicate 
my prior analysis in the new sample and find that my results remain inferentially unchanged. I 
also follow Kini et al. (2017) and use an alternative approach to define manufacturing 
industries.20 I obtain consistent results. Furthermore, to rule out the potential influence of the 
recent global financial crisis, I exclude years 2008 and 2009 in my sample and again my 
findings stay robust. 
 
2.5 Discussion and Conclusion 
            This study focuses on an undesired firm performance outcome, i.e., PHC 
incidences, and employs a configurational perspective in analyzing how CEO personal 
characteristics (“the person”), interplays with corporate governance (“the position”) and 
industry competition (“the environment”) in explaining the likelihood of PHCs. My results 
highlight the value of CEOs’ and BODs’ experiences as I show that the adverse effects of a 
CEO’s risk-taking personality on product quality can be mitigated when related knowledge has 
been developed inside the focal firm, from the end of either a CEO or a BOD, to control the 
CEO’s risk-taking behavior. I further show that external pressure, such as market competition, 
                                               
20 Specifically, I include firms from industries with following two-digit SIC: 20, 23, 26, 28, 34-39, 50-54, 56-59, 
73, 79, 87.  
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also interplays with CEO personality in the process and it is the confluence of CEO personal 
traits, corporate governance, and environment that affects a firm’s operational performance. 
    My study provides timely implications to the practice. Recent years have witnessed an 
increasing number of firms, including high profile ones such as McDonald’s, West-Ward 
Pharmaceuticals, etc. removing COO position from the top management team because firms 
believe that the COO’s role largely overlaps with the CEO’s and is thus redundant. My findings, 
however, suggest that prior experiences on operations make a good CEO and COO experiences 
are valuable to a CEO as well as a firm. Further, although studies argue that director interlocks 
undermine board independence and supervision quality (Yermack, 2004; Fich & Shivdasani, 
2007; Chiu, Teoh, & Tian, 2012) and interlocking directorates represent a controversial topic 
in practice, I demonstrate that interlocking directorships may bring significant value to a firm, 
as directors’ expertise from other companies will effectively conciliate the vacuum in their 
CEOs’ background and the set of knowledge on a collective level within a firm helps improve 
its operational performance (Hillman et al., 2009). 
    Like other studies on CEO personal traits, the interpretations of my findings are subject 
to some limitations. First, I infer a CEO’s risk-taking preferences from their observable 
characteristics, i.e., acquisition of an aviator license (Cain & McKeon, 2016; Sunder et al., 
2016). My measure captures CEOs who tend to be extreme cases in the risk-seeking category. 
Future research could validate this measure and explore how other dimensions of CEO 
personality affect their strategic decisions and firm performance. Secondly, I assume that CEOs’ 
operational experiences accrue through their previous COO employment. However, it is also 
possible that CEOs can access related information from other sources, such as their business 
partners, close friends, social peers, etc. Future research may investigate how CEOs obtain 
valuable information through multiple channels. Further, I show that BOD provides effective 
advisory and monitoring role in mitigating the PHC problems. Future studies could explore 
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whether alternative internal mechanisms are available in constraining inappropriate managerial 
behaviors. Besides, while I examine one possible negative consequence associated with a 
CEO’s innate risk-taking preferences, I acknowledge the possibility that CEOs with high-risk 
appetite may be more capable of handling corporate adversities including production and 
operational crises. More research is needed to explore how my findings apply to other contexts. 
Finally, Internal control over financial reporting (“ICFR”) is believed to be highly correlated 
with internal control over operation which could also affect the likelihood of occurrence of 
product harm crisis. As both corporate governance and top management team set the tone at 
the top to influence firms’ performance on “ICFR” and internal control over operation, future 
studies could explore these mediating processes through which corporate governance and top 
management team affect the occurrence of product harm crisis.  
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Appendix   
   Variable Definitions 
 
Variable Definition 
PHC An indicator variable equals one for firm-years with product harm crises, and zero otherwise 
PILOT An indicator variable equals one for CEOs with a pilot license, and zero otherwise 
CEOEXP An indicator variable equals one for CEOs with COO experiences, and zero otherwise 
INDCOM 
An indicator variable equals one for industries with high competition, and 
zero otherwise, where industry competition is measured by Herfindahl 
index  
SIZE Firm size calculated as natural logarithm of total assets 
LEV Leverage ratio calculated as total long-term debt scaled by total assets 
MTB Market-to-book ratio calculated as year-end market value scaled by book value of equity 
LOSS An indicator variable equals one if net income is negative, and zero otherwise 
SEG Firm complexity measured by the total number of business segments 
IO Percentage of shares owned by institutional shareholders 
TENURE CEO tenure measured by natural logarithm of the number of years that a CEO is in position 
DUALITY An indicator variable equals one if the CEO of a firm is also the chairman of the board of directors, and zero otherwise 
OPTION Value of stock option owned by natural logarithm of total value of unexercised exercisable stock options owned by a CEO 
BODSIZE Size of board of directors calculated as the natural logarithm of the total number of directors 
BODINDE An indicator variable equals one if the percentage of independent directors is higher than 75 percent, and zero otherwise 
BODEXP 
Industry expertise of independent directors calculated as the number of 
independent directors with industry expertise relative to the total number 
of independent directors, multiplied by 100 
AGE CEO age 
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          Figure 1 
Conceptual Framework of the Associations between CEO Characteristics, Corporate 
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Variable N mean sd median p25 p75 
PHC 3,114 0.110 0.313 0.000 0.000 0.000 
PILOT 3,114 0.033 0.179 0.000 0.000 0.000 
CEOEXP 3,114 0.573 0.495 1.000 0.000 1.000 
SIZE 3,114 7.291 1.622 7.192 6.147 8.423 
LEV 3,114 0.168 0.159 0.148 0.006 0.264 
MTB 3,114 2.848 2.624 2.188 1.492 3.393 
LOSS 3,114 0.180 0.384 0.000 0.000 0.000 
SEG 3,114 3.411 2.325 3.000 1.000 5.000 
IO 3,114 0.769 0.183 0.791 0.670 0.887 
TENURE 3,114 1.788 0.843 1.792 1.099 2.398 
DUALITY 3,114 0.261 0.439 0.000 0.000 1.000 
OPTION 3,114 6.259 3.591 7.463 4.540 8.853 
BODSIZE 3,114 2.176 0.249 2.197 1.946 2.303 
BODINDE 3,114 0.738 0.440 1.000 0.000 1.000 
BODEXP (in %) 3,114 17.038 21.499 11.111 0.000 25.000 
AGE 3,114 55.453 7.315 55.000 51.000 60.000 
INDCOM 3,114 0.547 0.498 1.000 0.000 1.000 
 
Note: This table presents descriptive statistics of variables used in the regressions.                                                         
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                                             Table 2 
                                         Correlation Matrix 
 
  Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
1 PHC                 
2 PILOT 0.02                
3 CEOEXP 0.05 0.05               
4 SIZE 0.29 0.13 0.14              
5 LEV 0.08 0.06 0.07 0.23             
6 MTB 0.02 0.01 -0.01 0.03 0.04            
7 LOSS -0.05 -0.04 0.04 -0.18 0.13 -0.10           
8 SEG 0.18 0.10 0.09 0.46 0.17 -0.11 -0.05          
9 IO -0.05 -0.09 0.08 -0.02 0.06 -0.04 -0.02 0.00         
10 TENURE -0.12 0.03 -0.25 -0.16 -0.07 -0.01 -0.07 -0.07 -0.01        
11 DUALITY 0.03 0.03 -0.04 0.17 0.08 0.02 -0.05 0.06 -0.05 0.22       
12 OPTION 0.02 0.07 0.04 0.17 -0.02 0.22 -0.27 0.01 0.05 0.15 0.08      
13 BODSIZE 0.24 0.10 0.15 0.60 0.22 0.03 -0.08 0.35 -0.06 -0.17 0.13 0.10     
14 BODINDE 0.08 -0.05 0.11 0.14 0.10 0.05 -0.03 0.08 0.22 -0.09 -0.01 0.11 0.15    
15 BODEXP -0.07 -0.03 0.05 -0.10 0.00 -0.01 0.07 -0.13 0.08 -0.03 -0.05 0.01 -0.10 0.05   
16 AGE 0.00 0.04 -0.06 0.04 0.03 -0.05 -0.03 0.08 -0.04 0.42 0.21 -0.01 -0.01 -0.07 -0.06  
17 INDCOM -0.05 -0.05 -0.02 -0.14 -0.05 0.01 0.02 -0.08 0.00 0.02 -0.05 0.02 -0.08 -0.02 0.06 -0.03 
Note: 
This table presents Pearson pairwise correlations between variables used in the regressions. Correlations significant at 5 percent level are in boldface. 
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                                Table 3 
          CEO Risk-taking Personality, Operational Experiences, and PHCs 
 
  Dependent Variable = PHC 
Variable (1) (2) 
PILOT -0.096 1.494* 
 (-0.197) (1.950) 
CEOEXP 0.127 0.205 
 (0.511) (0.794) 
PILOT*CEOEXP  -2.036** 
  (-1.981) 
SIZE 0.600*** 0.603*** 
 (5.113) (5.123) 
LEV 1.365 1.402 
 (1.384) (1.414) 
MTB 0.014 0.015 
 (0.397) (0.412) 
LOSS -0.555** -0.536** 
 (-2.206) (-2.126) 
SEG 0.047 0.049 
 (0.739) (0.766) 
OI -0.376 -0.306 
 (-0.535) (-0.418) 
TENURE -0.519*** -0.535*** 
 (-3.807) (-3.913) 
DUALITY 0.049 0.082 
 (0.167) (0.284) 
OPTION -0.049* -0.048* 
 (-1.748) (-1.712) 
BODSIZE 1.644** 1.669** 
 (2.531) (2.566) 
BODINDE 0.402 0.378 
 (1.124) (1.066) 
BODEXP -0.006 -0.007 
 (-1.064) (-1.163) 
AGE 0.027 0.027 
 (1.389) (1.354) 
Constant -12.109*** -12.396*** 
 (-5.884) (-5.962) 
   
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Chi-squared 239.72*** 243.88*** 
Pseudo R2 0.32 0.33 
Observations 3,114 3,114 
Note:  
This table presents logit regression results on the effects of CEO risk-taking personality (PILOT) on the 
likelihood of PHCs, and the moderating effect of a CEO’s operational experiences (CEOEXP) on the 
relationship between CEO risk-taking personality (PILOT) and the likelihood of PHCs. The z-statistics are 
reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate two-tailed statistical significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, 
respectively. See Appendix for variable definitions. 
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                                Table 4 
                       The Effects of BOD’s Expertise 
 
  Dependent Variable = PHC 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Variable 
Full Sample CEO without Operational Experiences  
CEO with Operational 
Experiences  
PILOT -0.045 4.638*** -0.507 
 (-0.085) (4.793) (-0.865) 
BODEXP -0.006 -0.011 -0.002 
 (-1.026) (-1.030) (-0.288) 
PILOT*BODEXP -0.009 -0.201*** 0.019 
 (-0.337) (-2.659) (0.697) 
SIZE 0.600*** 0.786*** 0.656*** 
 (5.111) (3.295) (4.050) 
LEV 1.354 1.353 0.262 
 (1.373) (0.850) (0.201) 
MTB 0.014 0.041 0.024 
 (0.400) (0.757) (0.567) 
LOSS -0.552** -0.163 -0.617** 
 (-2.203) (-0.415) (-2.014) 
SEG 0.047 0.046 0.032 
 (0.739) (0.563) (0.420) 
OI -0.376 0.105 -1.203 
 (-0.536) (0.090) (-1.366) 
TENURE -0.520*** -0.803*** -0.467** 
 (-3.808) (-3.695) (-2.345) 
DUALITY 0.048 0.353 0.062 
 (0.161) (0.699) (0.165) 
OPTION -0.049* -0.058 -0.045 
 (-1.742) (-0.822) (-1.166) 
BODSIZE 1.639** 0.883 1.839** 
 (2.517) (1.056) (2.075) 
BODINDE 0.401 -0.159 0.710 
 (1.125) (-0.299) (1.552) 
AGE 0.027 0.070*** -0.003 
 (1.397) (2.715) (-0.119) 
CEOEXP 0.125   
 (0.502)   
Constant -12.097*** -14.838*** -10.783*** 
 (-5.877) (-4.647) (-4.086) 
    
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Chi-squared 239.9*** 106.95*** 219.70*** 
Pseudo R2 0.32 0.40 0.35 
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  Dependent Variable = PHC 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Variable 
Full Sample CEO without Operational Experiences  
CEO with Operational 
Experiences  
Observations 3,114 1,254 1,784 
Note: 
The table presents logit regression results on the moderating effect of BOD industry experience (BODEXP) on 
the relationship between CEO risk-taking personality (PILOT) and the likelihood of PHCs. Results based on the 
full sample is presented Column (1). Results based on a subsample consisting of CEOs without operational 
experiences are presented in Column (2). Results based on a subsample consisting of CEOs with operational 
experiences are presented in Column (3). The z-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate tow-

















































                                 Table 5 
                      The Effects of Market Competition 
 
  Dependent Variable = PHC 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Variable 
Full Sample CEO without Operational Experiences  
CEO with Operational 
Experiences 
PILOT 0.490 2.848*** 0.148 
 (0.924) (3.793) (0.226) 
INDCOM -0.244 0.106 -0.488*** 
 (-1.603) (0.435) (-2.609) 
PILOT*INDCOM -2.244*** -1.296** -2.413*** 
 (-3.064) (-2.191) (-3.265) 
SIZE 0.580*** 0.786*** 0.618*** 
 (4.970) (3.251) (3.902) 
LEV 1.363 1.573 0.205 
 (1.385) (1.000) (0.159) 
MTB 0.018 0.036 0.030 
 (0.497) (0.686) (0.679) 
LOSS -0.575** -0.150 -0.656** 
 (-2.318) (-0.380) (-2.185) 
SEG 0.051 0.058 0.044 
 (0.799) (0.729) (0.578) 
OI -0.386 0.203 -1.183 
 (-0.555) (0.172) (-1.374) 
TENURE -0.543*** -0.781*** -0.518*** 
 (-4.065) (-3.613) (-2.604) 
DUALITY 0.051 0.310 0.055 
 (0.171) (0.621) (0.143) 
OPTION -0.047* -0.064 -0.042 
 (-1.652) (-0.903) (-1.076) 
BODSIZE 1.692*** 0.961 1.946** 
 (2.583) (1.166) (2.197) 
BODINDE 0.400 -0.098 0.723 
 (1.126) (-0.187) (1.586) 
BODEXP -0.007 -0.013 -0.002 
 (-1.114) (-1.154) (-0.318) 
AGE 0.027 0.069*** -0.002 
 (1.418) (2.596) (-0.084) 
CEOEXP 0.143   
 (0.569)   
Constant -12.004*** -14.818*** -10.585*** 
 (-5.885) (-4.471) (-4.182) 
    
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
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  Dependent Variable = PHC 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Variable 
Full Sample CEO without Operational Experiences  
CEO with Operational 
Experiences 
Chi-squared 271.82*** 141.87*** 231.21*** 
Pseudo R2 0.33 0.40 0.36 
Observations 3,114 1,254 1,784 
Note: 
The table presents logit regression results on the moderating effect of market competition (INDCOM) on the 
relationship between CEO risk-taking personality (PILOT) and the likelihood of PHCs. Results based on the full 
sample is presented Column (1). Results based on a subsample consisting of CEOs without operational 
experiences are presented in Column (2). Results based on a subsample consisting of CEOs with operational 
experiences are presented in Column (3). The z-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate two-




                   Results based on Propensit Score Matching (PSM) 
 
Panel A: Checking Covariate Balance 
 
 Before PSM  
  PILOT=0 PILOT=1   
Variables N Mean N Mean Mean Difference 
SIZE 3011 7.256 103 8.342 -1.086*** 
LEV 3011 0.166 103 0.216 -0.050*** 
MTB 3011 2.818 103 3.731 -0.913*** 
LOSS 3011 0.182 103 0.107 0.076** 
SEG 3011 3.369 103 4.641 -1.272*** 
OI 3011 0.771 103 0.713 0.058*** 
CEOTENURE 3011 1.783 103 1.928 -0.145* 
CEODUALITY 3011 0.256 103 0.427 -0.171*** 
OPTION 3011 6.191 103 8.261 -2.070*** 
BODSIZE 3011 2.172 103 2.304 -0.132*** 
BODINDE 3011 79.096 103 81.195 -2.099* 
BODEXP 3011 0.737 103 0.770 -0.030 
AGE 3011 55.433 103 56.039 -0.605 
      
 After PSM  
  PILOT=0 PILOT=1   
Variables N Mean N Mean Mean Difference 
SIZE 60 7.714 60 7.963 -0.248 
LEV 60 0.214 60 0.184 0.029 
MTB 60 3.531 60 3.438 0.092 
LOSS 60 0.117 60 0.100 0.017 
SEG 60 3.833 60 4.367 -0.533 
OI 60 0.708 60 0.745 -0.037 
CEOTENURE 60 1.724 60 1.988 -0.264* 
CEODUALITY 60 0.350 60 0.400 -0.050 
OPTION 60 7.655 60 7.737 -0.081 
BODSIZE 60 2.265 60 2.267 -0.002 
BODINDE 60 0.750 60 0.750 0.000 
BODEXP 60 13.143 60 15.620 -2.477 












Panel B: Regression Results based on Matched Sample 
  Dependent Variable = PHC 
Variable (1) (2) 
PILOT -0.953 2.612* 
 (-1.101) (1.667) 
CEOEXP -1.841** -0.484 
 (-2.076) (-0.497) 
PILOT*CEOEXP  -5.408** 
  (-2.258) 
SIZE 0.940 0.831 
 (1.639) (1.396) 
LEV 4.340 2.769 
 (0.957) (0.594) 
MTB 0.054 0.060 
 (0.362) (0.520) 
LOSS -2.809 -1.026 
 (-1.180) (-0.454) 
SEG 0.444** 0.416** 
 (2.220) (2.126) 
IO 1.307 2.105 
 (0.457) (0.584) 
TENURE -0.675 -1.399** 
 (-1.220) (-2.041) 
DUALITY 0.487 1.197 
 (0.564) (1.090) 
OPTION -0.070 -0.063 
 (-0.949) (-0.535) 
BODSIZE 1.709 3.148 
 (0.546) (0.863) 
BODINDE -0.027 0.043 
 (-0.456) (0.525) 
BODEXP 0.009 -0.005 
 (0.257) (-0.135) 
AGE 0.057 0.051 
 (0.694) (0.632) 
Constant -16.647* -24.727*** 
 (-1.710) (-2.786) 
   
Chi-squared 41.64*** 57.14*** 
Pseudo R2 0.41 0.47 
Observations 120 120 
Note:  
Panel A presents covariate comparisons before and after PSM. Panel B presents logit regression results on the 
effects of CEO risk-taking personality (PILOT) on the likelihood of PHCs, and the moderating effect of a 
CEO’s operational experiences (CEOEXP) on the relationship between CEO risk-taking personality (PILOT) 
and the likelihood of PHCs based on the PSM sample. The z-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** 



















































3.1  Introduction 
I investigate managers’ earnings manipulation behavior in product harm crises. Product harm 
crises are defined as publicized events whereby a firm’s product is reported as being defective 
or fails to fulfill a mandatory safety standard (Dawar and Pillutla 2000). Recent product harm 
crises that made headlines include the recalls by Samsung of its Galaxy Note 7 smartphone in 
2016 and Toyota vehicle recalls in 2009 and 2010. Such crises are gaining prevalence and 
drawing much publicity.21 For example, according to Advisen Insurance Intelligence (2012), 
2,363 consumer products, pharmaceuticals, and medical devices were recalled in the United 
States in 2011, representing a 62 percent increase from 2007. Similarly, the National Highway 
Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) reported that vehicle recalls increased by 76 percent 
(from 339 to 599) between 1994 to 2003 and 2004 to 2013 (NHTSA 2015; Gao, Xie, Wang, 
and Wilbur 2015).  
When a product harm crisis occurs, firms incur significant direct costs, such as expenses 
associated with product recalls, production halts, and remediation (Jarrell and Peltzman 
1985).22,23 But more importantly, a product harm crisis can result in significant indirect costs, 
particularly losses in firms’ reputation, and thus a reduction in customers’ trust and purchase 
intention (e.g., Chen, Ganesan, and Liu 2009; Dawar and Pillutla 2000; Devin and Halpern 
2001; Jarrell and Peltzman 1985; Pruitt and Peterson 1986; Van, Helsen, and Dekimpe 2007). 
Because of the adverse impact of product harm crises, prior research documents that managers 
actively engage in marketing, recalling, and social media strategies to salvage their firm’s 
                                               
21 Incidents that are out of the firm’s control, such as product tampering, are not considered as product harm crises. To this 
effect, since product recalls may include such cases, I do not define product harm crisis as recall incidents. I discuss how I 
measure product harm crises in Section 3.1.  
22  Direct charges associated with product harm crises are recognized as special items (see the General Motors [GM] 2014 
annual report), other operating expenses (see Mattel 2007 annual report) or as a reduction of net sales and an increase of Selling, 
General & Administrative Expense (SG&A) and Cost of Goods Sold (COGS) (see Kellogg 2010 annual report).  
23 I focus on the accrual-based earnings management and posit that managers may use such techniques to boost the total 
earnings. I do not claim or expect that such earnings management can entirely offset the negative impact of these direct costs 
on total earnings.  
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impaired reputation (Chen et al. 2009; Cleeren, Harald, Heerde, and Dekimpe 2013; Gao et al. 
2015; Lee, Hutton, and Shu 2015; Zavyalova, Pfarrer, and Reger 2012). 
In this paper, I investigate whether firms manage earnings upward as another way to 
restore customer confidence and attenuate CEO personal losses when faced with a product 
harm crisis. 24  Despite the costs associated with product harm crises, there is anecdotal 
evidence that firms quite often project a strong financial image in the year of a product harm 
crisis. 25  I aim to understand whether such a strong financial image reflects a genuine 
performance or earnings management. In the context of a product harm crisis, the pressures on 
managers to present a strong financial image and to show the firm’s ability to generate earnings 
get intensified, as both influence customers’ perception about the firm’s ability to honor 
implicit claims in the future26,27 (Bowen, DuCharme, and Shores 1995; Maksimovic and 
Titman 1991). Such implicit claims encompass the expected quality of the products, as well as 
the promise of timely delivery, continuing warranty service and parts supply, and future 
enhancements (Cornell and Shapiro 1987). 
Given the various costs, especially the reputation damage, that a firm has to suffer in a 
product harm crisis, managers can be particularly concerned about disclosing weak financial 
performance for the following reasons. First, a product harm crisis can induce financial 
difficulties in the firm. Since customers are particularly reluctant to buy products from 
                                               
24 I do not rule out the possibility that the incentive of earnings management in the case of a product harm crisis is induced by 
the need to reassure shareholders. However, shareholders’ biggest concern about a product harm crisis also arises from the 
potential loss of customers and sales. Restoring customers’ confidence can eventually also please shareholders.  
25  For example, GM’s annual report for 2014 (a year in which there was a major GM product recall) states that: “In 2014, I 
earned net income to common stockholders of $2.8 billion, including recall-related costs. Turning to Earnings Before Interest 
& Tax (EBIT) adjusted results, I earned $6.5 billion, which included $2.8 billion in recall-related expenses … These results 
are important because this is the first year since 2010 that the company met its target for core operating financial performance.” 
Similarly, Mattel’s 2007 annual report mentions that “Globally, Mattel delivered a 6 percent increase in net revenues in 2007 … 
I did see strong performance across many areas of my portfolio … Despite the costs associated with the product recalls, I were 
also able to achieve improvements in gross margin and overall profitability.” In a regulatory filing in January 2017, the 
technical giant Samsung Electronics said its fourth-quarter operating profit jumped 50% to its highest in over three years, as a 
diverse business portfolio masked the negative impact of its failed Note 7 phones (Reuters, January 24, 2017). 
26 Trust-based relationships are called implicit contracts. Implicit claims have no legal standing, so they can be breached by 
either party. Bull (1987) argues that there are forces that prevent firms from breaching their reputation of fulfilling their 
implicit claims. Firms have incentives to build their reputation because the reputation determines the trade terms between 
firms and their stakeholders (Titman 1984; Cornell and Shapiro 1987). 
27 Following prior studies (e.g., Bowen et al. 1995; Maksimovic and Titman 1991; Hui et al. 2012), reputation and perceived 
ability to fulfill implicit claims are used in an interchangeable manner in this paper.  
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distressed firms because such firms are more likely to shirk on their product quality and will 
be less likely to continue to provide adequate supply in the future (Titman 1984; Maksimovic 
and Titman 1991), a weak financial performance in a product harm crisis is likely to create a 
particularly negative impact on customers’ confidence. In addition, showing weak financial 
performance may encourage financially strong competitors to aggressively advertise or price 
their products with an aim to drive out the financially distressed firms that are experiencing 
product harm crises (e.g., Bolton and Scharfstein 1990; Opler and Titman 1994). Second, even 
if the product harm crisis does not cause a significant financial difficulty to the crisis firm, it 
can still cast doubts about product quality and safety and, hence, directly damage customers’ 
perceptions of the firm’s ability to fulfill implicit claims in the future (Devin and Halpern 2001; 
Cornell and Shapiro 1987). Projecting a better financial image by showing strong earnings can 
reassure customers that the firm has the resources to continue investing in product quality. 
Third, industrial customers assess suppliers’ financial health to mitigate information 
asymmetry in their long-term supply chain relationship (Costello 2013; Hui, Klasa, and Yeung 
2012). Supplier firms that experience product quality issues have incentive to manipulate 
earnings in order to overcome the adverse effect of product harm crises so as to maintain their 
long-term relationships with industrial customers.  
Moreover, I also conjecture that managers manipulate earnings in the face of a product 
harm crisis to attenuate personal costs. Given the negative influence of the product harm crisis 
on a firm’s stock price, managers can suffer losses if they have significant equity or option 
holdings (Charitou, Lambertides, and Trigeorgis 2007). Furthermore, in some extreme cases, 
managers bear the responsibility for the crisis by either being fired or by resigning, thus 
suggesting that a product harm crisis can induce managers’ career concerns. Hence, self-
interested managers are likely to manipulate earnings upward so as to alleviate the personal 
costs associated with the product harm crisis (Fudenberg and Tirole 1995).  
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To assess whether firms engage in earnings management during product harm crises, I 
examine signed discretionary accruals for a sample of U.S. manufacturing firms experiencing 
such crises from 2002 to 2012. I match firms experiencing product harm crises (crisis firms) 
with firms not experiencing product harm crises (non-crisis firms) using a propensity score 
matching procedure. Based on 575 pairs of crisis firms and non-crisis firms, I find that crisis 
firms have significantly greater signed discretionary accruals, suggesting that managers 
manage earnings upward in product harm crises. This upward earning management is 
positively associated with the severity of the product harm crisis. As an alternative measure of 
upward earnings management, I use downward accounting restatements (i.e., restatements 
caused by inflated earnings) in the subsequent periods due to accounting frauds or Generally 
Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) misapplication in the year of the product harm crisis. 
I find a positive relation between product harm crises and downward accounting restatements. 
In addition, I find that managing earnings upward appears to be effective in the short run. That 
is, managers of crisis firms who manipulate earnings upward in the crisis year are less likely to 
lose major clients in the following year after the product harm crisis, and also are less likely to 
experience bonus cuts in the year of product harm crisis and forced turnover in the following 
year.  
In addition, consistent with a product harm crisis impairing a firm’s reputation and thus 
undermining customers’ perception about its ability to fulfill implicit claims, I also find that 
firms are more likely to manage earnings upward when reputation and implicit claims matter 
more to the firm and when the product harm crisis is more severe. Moreover, I observe that 
CEOs who bear greater personal costs from product harm crises engage in more upward 
earnings management. Overall, my evidence is consistent with managers having strong firm-
level and personal incentives to manage earnings upward to carry them through the crisis.  
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This study makes several contributions to the literature. First, given that product harm crises 
are becoming more prevalent in today’s business, it is essential to understand the impact of 
such crises on firms, as well as firms’ reactions. Prior studies document that firms react to 
product harm crises by adopting marketing, recalling, and social media communications 
strategies (e.g., Chen et al. 2009; Cleeren et al. 2013; Lee et al. 2015). My study complements 
these prior findings by showing that managers also leverage their financial reporting discretion 
by managing earnings upward to maintain their firm’s reputation and, hence, retain customers’ 
confidence and safeguard managers’ personal interests.  
Second, this study contributes to the literature investigating customers’ implicit claims 
as an incentive for firms to manipulate earnings (Bowen et al. 1995; Burgstahler and Dichev 
1997; Dou, Hope, and Thomas 2013; Matsumoto 2002; Raman and Shahrur 2008).28 I identify 
a specific setting in which firms’ perceived ability to fulfill implicit claims to customers is 
threatened by an operational problem and finds that managers use their accounting discretion 
to manage earnings upward to salvage their firm’s reputation. Moreover, my results further 
corroborate the existence of implicit claims by both industrial and consumer customers, since 
I find the upward earnings management is present in firms dealing with both industrial and 
consumer customers. While industrial customers directly rely on accounting information since 
it is verifiable and audited, consumer customers can also learn about the company’s financial 
outlook from news media and financial analysts, which in turn change their perceptions of the 
firm’s financial condition and its ability to fulfill implicit claims (Matsumoto 2002; Tian and 
Zhou 2015).  
Third, this study contributes to the literature on corporate social responsibility (CSR). 
Prior studies usually aggregate different dimensions of CSR and investigate the relation 
                                               
28 Generally, the implicit claims have no legal standing, so they can be breached by either party. Bull (1987) argues that 
there are forces that prevent firms from breaching their reputation to fulfill their implicit claims. Firms have incentives to 
build their reputation because the reputation determines the trade terms between firms and their stakeholders (Titman 1984; 
Cornell and Shapiro 1987). 
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between CSR performance and reporting quality under normal conditions. The common theme 
is that managers’ business ethics lead firms to perform well on both CSR and reporting, leading 
to a positive association between the two (Kim, Park, and Wier 2012). In this paper, I focus on 
a specific dimension of CSR, namely product quality and safety crises, and show that it affects 
managerial incentives in financial reporting. 
Lastly, this study contributes to the literature on the relationship between crises and 
earnings management. Prior research shows that firms typically reduce the extent of their 
earnings management in the face of macro-level financial crises (e.g., Kim, Chung, and Firth 
2003; Filip and Raffournier 2014). In contrast, I find that firms increase earnings management 
in response to firm-specific product harm crises. The difference is probably due to managers 
having less incentive to manipulate earnings in a global financial crisis, given the higher market 
tolerance for poor performance (Filip and Raffournier 2014). However, firms do not have such 
market tolerance in firm-specific crises/wrongdoings such as product harm crises. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses prior literature and 
develops the hypothesis. Section 3 discusses research design, including the sample construction. 
Section 4 reports the empirical results. Additional tests are provided in Section 5. Section 6 
concludes the paper.  
 
3.2 PRIOR LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT  
3.2.1 Prior Studies on Product Harm Crises 
A product harm crisis affects a firm’s short-term performance, due to direct costs associated 
with handling the crisis. In this respect, Jarrell and Peltzman (1985) point toward the costs of 
correcting/replacing the defective product, the transaction costs of the recall process, the costs 
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of unsold inventory, the costs of potential litigation, and the costs of changes in practices to 
improve quality.  
While the direct costs of a product harm crisis can be threatening enough for firms’ 
financial performance, the impairment of their reputation as a reliable manufacturer of high-
quality products is of greater concern (Jarrell and Peltzman 1985). As a result, a large part of 
the loss of market capitalization caused by a product harm crisis is due to its negative impact 
on a firm’s reputation and brand equity,29 rather than its direct costs (Dawar and Pillutla 2000; 
Jarrell and Peltzman 1985; Pruitt and Peterson 1986).30 For example, Van et al. (2007) indicate 
that crisis firms will suffer sales losses on the recalled product itself, and also from a spillover 
effect on non-affected but associated products. Furthermore, the sales losses undermine the 
financial and stock market performance of affected firms (Barber and Darrough 1996).  
Managers often consider a safety-related product crisis to have the most negative 
impact on corporate reputation (Crisis Reputation Preparedness Study 2011). Thus, in an effort 
to regain customers and restore a firm’s reputation, they are likely to engage in various 
strategies via social media platforms (e.g., Facebook), recalling actions (e.g., technical, 
ceremonial), and marketing (e.g., advertising, pricing) (Chen et al. 2009; Cleeren et al. 2013; 
Gao et al. 2015; Lee et al. 2015; Zavyalova et al. 2012). Yet, so far no studies have investigated 
the effect of product harm crises on managers’ reporting incentives.  
 
3.2.2 Hypothesis Development (Figure1) 
                                               
29Brand equity, defined as the overall value of a brand, is equivalent to the customers’ trust in the brand’s ability to fulfill 
expected benefits and the customers’ willingness to buy the brand’s products over competing brands’ products (e.g., Keller 
1993; Dutta and Pulling 2011). Brand equity also leads to a spillover effect from one product to other products. For example, 
the recent Samsung Galaxy Note 7 explosion scandal cast doubt on the quality of other Samsung products. 
30Jarrell and Peltzman (1985) find that shareholders’ wealth losses associated with product recalls are 12 times larger than 
the direct costs of recalls. Cornell and Shapiro (1987) argue that the costs can be attributed to the loss of reputation to fulfill 
implicit claims.  
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Prior research documents that managers have various incentives to manipulate earnings, 
and that earnings management behavior is prevalent (Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal 2005).31 
In the case of a product harm crisis, during which a firm’s reputation as well as its financial 
performance and information environment are greatly impaired, I expect that managers will 
engage in income-increasing earnings management for the following reasons. 
First, when selling products, a firm enters into both explicit and implicit contracts with 
its customers, and a large part of the ongoing relation actually remains implicit. For instance, 
customers usually expect a certain product quality level, as well as a commitment to 
continuously provide parts and services, timely delivery, warranty service, and future 
enhancements (Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy 2002; Cornell and Shapiro 1987). Both existing 
and future customers’ willingness to buy from a firm is affected by their perceptions about its 
ability to honor its implicit commitments in the product market (Bowen et al. 1995; 
Maksimovic et al. 1991). Su, Zhao, and Zhou (2014) find that firms disclosing internal control 
weaknesses under Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Section 404 subsequently experience a decline in 
sales growth (i.e., lower customers’ demands), most likely because customers question firms’ 
sustainability and future ability to fulfill their implicit claims.32  
A product harm crisis can bring financial hardship to a firm, as it incurs direct and 
indirect costs to resolve it. Reporting weak financial performance can lower customers’ 
purchase intentions due to the concern that the firm will not honor future implicit claims, most 
likely by switching to poor-quality inputs, by reducing future supply, and failing to honor 
warranty claims in the future (Maksimovic and Titman 1991; Opler and Titman 1994; Titman 
1984; Hammond 2013). For example, Kini, Shenoy, and Subramaniam (2016) find that firms 
                                               
31For example, prior studies find that seasonal equity offering (Cohen et al. 2010), financial crises in Asia or in Europe (Chia 
et al. 2007; Filip and Raffournier 2014), an initial public offering (Ball et al. 2008), an acquisition financed by firms’ equity 
(Botsari and Meeks 2008), management buyouts (Perry and Williams 1994), open-market repurchase (Gong et al. 2008), and 
CEO turnover or interim CEO succession (Chen et al. 2015) all incentivize managers to engage in earnings management. 
32 Similarly, Karpoff, Lee, and Martin (2008) find that firms exhibit a reduction in stock market value due to implicit claims 
related to a reputation loss caused by misstatement.  
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with higher leverage or higher distress likelihood are more likely to produce poor-quality 
products that result in product recalls. Financial constraints are also found to lead to product 
shortfalls in the supermarket industry (Matsa 2011) and worse on-time performance in the 
airline industry (Phillips and Sertsios 2013; Rose 1990). Besides, reporting weak performance 
in a product harm crisis can also attract aggressive advertising campaigns, greater production, 
and price low-balling from financially sound competitors, which have incentive to take the 
opportunity to predate the existing or potential customers from financially impaired firms 
(Opler and Titman 1994; Bernard 2016). Given the reason above, managers can have incentive 
not to reveal weak financial performance of firms33. To the extent that earnings are one of the 
most important indicators of financial status, managers of crisis firms can be particularly 
concerned about disclosing weak earning numbers and hence have clear incentive to manage 
earnings upward in a product harm crisis.  
Second, even if the product harm crisis does not lead to financial difficulties, the crisis 
itself already severely affects the firm’s reputation to fulfill implicit claims toward its 
customers (Cornell and Shapiro 1987; Devin and Halpern 2001; Jarrell and Peltzman 1985). 
First of all, experiencing a product harm crisis distorts the customers’ confidence toward the 
firm’s ability to manufacture reliable and high-quality products, and hence lowers customers’ 
trust toward crisis firm (Dawar and Pillutla 2000). In addition, in cases of multi-product or 
multi-brand companies, the spillover effect of a product harm crisis suggests that customers 
will question firms’ ability to manufacture non-affected but associated products (Van et al. 
2007). Better financial performance can alleviate the negative effect of a product harm crisis 
on the customers’ perception of the firm’s future ability to fulfill implicit claims, since 
                                               
33 An anecdotal evidence also shows this point. Dun & Bradstreet (2010, 12): “One global teleconferencing company 
learned the hard way that suppliers are not always truthful when it comes to sharing bad news. In the middle of a new 
product launch, rumors flew that a sole source supplier of a critical component was in financial difficulty. When confronted, 




customers care about the financial image of the firm from which they purchase 
products/services, even when the firm is not financially distressed (Bowen et al. 1995). This is 
because projecting a better financial image by showing strong earnings can reassure customers 
that the firm has abundant financial resources and thus is competent to fulfill its implicit claims 
in the long term (Aaker, Vohs, and Mogilner 2010; Bowen et al. 1995; Tian and Zhou 2015)34. 
In line with this argument, prior studies document that firms use upward earnings management 
to avoid losses (Burgstahler and Dichev 1997), to meet analyst forecasts (Matsumoto, 2002), 
and to portray a rosy financial prospect (Raman and Shahrur 2008) in a bid to influence 
customers’ assessments of firms’ future abilities to fulfill their implicit claims. When surveying 
executives, Graham et al. (2005) also report that a majority of Chief Financial Officers (CFOs) 
are willing to manipulate earnings to manage the customers’ perception.  
Third, for industrial customers who typically enter into a long-term relationship with 
the supplier firm, a product harm crisis and its financial implications may lead to the severance 
or setback of the long-term relationship. Industrial customers are concerned the supplier may 
breach explicit contract terms in the long run due to the financial difficulty and reputation loss 
(Cen et al., 2017). For example, the customer may be concerned whether the supplier has 
sufficient resources to deliver products and services determined in their long-term contracts. In 
addition, customers in such long-term relationships may also worry that suppliers will withhold 
their relationship-specific investments that aim to improve product quality, delivery efficiency, 
and other long-term performance. Therefore, a sound financial performance can reassure long-
term customers and prevent breaches of long-term contracts (Costello et al. 2013).  
                                               
34  One of the anecdotal examples used in Bowen et al. (1995) to support their argument that customers care about firms’ 
accounting number and thus earnings is the advertisement of La Cie. La Cie advertises that “the hard drives it manufactures 
are backed by $400 million in assets. That means you can trust La Cie to provide a constant source of high quality machines 
and components. And you can be certain that we'll be around to help you with service and support. For a long, long time. (Mac 
User, September 1991, p. 95)”. Besides, earnings matter particularly in the case of product harm crisis because the press and 
media usually publicize firms’ earnings performance and the product recall/crisis in the news headline. For example, “Samsung 
earnings soar in Q4 despite unprecedented Note 7 recall” (Yahoo 2017 January). “Samsung to overtake Apple with record 
profits despite scandals” (Technology 2017 August). “Toyota earnings up 27% despite recalls in U.S.”(USA Today 2010 




Although managers’ incentives to restore reputation and attenuate personal losses imply 
a positive relation between experiencing a product harm crisis and income-increasing earnings 
management, there are counterarguments that suggest such an association may not exist or may 
even be negative. First, as a publicized event, a product harm crisis attracts larger media 
scrutiny and more negative media coverage (Rhee et al. 2006; Zavyalova et al. 2012). Knowing 
the occurrence of a product harm crisis, auditors, investors, creditors, customers, and suppliers 
are likely to increase monitoring and scrutiny over the crisis firms, thus restraining 
opportunities to manage earnings (Chia et al. 2007; Filip and Raffournier 2014; Francis, Hasan, 
and Wu 2013;). For example, DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Skinner (1994) find that firms with 
consecutive losses exhibit more income-decreasing accounting choices due to increased 
monitoring from auditors and lenders. Studies also find that, in the recent financial crisis, firms 
manipulated earnings less partly because of the increased scrutiny from stakeholders (Francis 
et al. 2013; Filip and Raffournier 2014). Second, in anticipation of product liabilities lawsuits 
or securities lawsuits, firms may manage earning downward to avoid lawsuits from customers 
and shareholders or, alternatively, to reduce the amount of any settlement or fine. These 
possibilities point toward a null or a negative relation between product harm crises and earnings 
management.  
Given the above competing arguments, it remains an empirical question whether 
managers engage in income-increasing earnings management when faced with a product harm 
crisis. Therefore, I state the following hypothesis in the null form:  





3.3 RESEARCH DESIGN  
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3.3.1 Sample and Identification of Firms Experiencing Product Harm Crises 
Data about firms experiencing product harm crises come from MSCI ESG KLD Stats database 
(KLD). My sample covers the period from 2002 to 2012. I rely on the product category in KLD 
to identify firms that experienced product harm crises during the sample period. Specifically, 
regarding firms’ engagements in product safety and quality, KLD reports separately the number 
of strengths and concerns for each firm in each year. According to MSCI (2015), the concern 
indicator is “designed to assess the severity of controversies related to the quality and safety of 
a firm’s products and services. Factors affecting this evaluation include, but are not limited to, 
a history of involvement in product safety-related legal cases, widespread or egregious 
instances of recalls or fines due to defective or unsafe products and services, resistance to 
improved practices, and criticism by Non-Governmental Organization (NGOs) and/or other 
third-party observers”. Kashmiri and Brower (2016) validate the product quality concern 
variable in KLD, confirming that the records are a reliable indicator of product harm crises.35 
I consider a firm to have a product harm crisis in a given year if the firm received a non-zero 
value of the product quality concern variable in KLD, and accordingly create a variable 
PCRISIS that equals one if a firm-year has a product harm crisis, and zero otherwise. 
I merge KLD with Compustat, Audit Analytics, Thomson Reuters 13-F, and I/B/E/S to 
obtain firms’ financial data, auditor data, institutional shareholding, and financial analyst 
coverage. 19,265 observations were left in the sample after merging different data sources. 
Since the focus of the paper is product harm crises, I concentrate on manufacturing firms and, 
hence, subsequently retain only U.S. firms in the manufacturing industry (i.e., two-digit SIC 
codes from 20 to 39). I further require that manufacturing industries defined by two-digit SIC 
codes in the sample must have at least one incidence of product harm crisis during the sample 
                                               
35 They independently code the events related to product harm crises based on articles, press release, and reports on product 
recalls, as well as product-related litigation and compensatory damages. They find that the hand-collected data match the 
product concern variable in the KLD product category.  
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period. After deleting firms with missing values in the regressions, 6,806 firm-years in the 
manufacturing industries were retained in the sample, of which 641 firm-years are identified 
as having had product harm crises. Panel A of Table 1 presents the sample distribution by year. 
The percentage of firms having product harm crises ranges from 7 to 12 percent in my sample 
period. Panel B of Table 1 reports the sample distribution by industry. Industries producing 
chemical products, fabricated metal, glass, and rubber have the highest percentage of product 
harm crises. On the other hand, firms in publishing and printing have the lowest percentage of 
product harm crisis.  
[Insert Table 1] 
 
3.3.2 Propensity Score Matching Between Crisis Firms and Non-Crisis Firms  
Panel C of Table 1 compares firm characteristics across the 641 observations with product 
harm crises and the 6,165 observations without product harm crises. On average, compared 
with non-crisis firms, crisis firms are larger and exhibit higher leverage, better performance, 
higher sales growth, lower market-to-book ratio, greater analyst coverage, a higher ratio of PPE, 
a lower percentage of equity shares owned by CEOs, and a lower likelihood of having a Chief 
Operating Officer (COO) among the five highest-paid executives. The comparisons in Panel C 
of Table 1 indicate that crisis firms differ from non-crisis firms along several key firm features, 
suggesting potential endogeneity related to the occurrence of product harm crises. Therefore, I 
employ propensity score matching (PSM) to control for observable differences between crisis 
firms and non-crisis firms. This enhances my causal inference that product harm crises affect 
earnings management directly, rather than that some omitted variables affect both product harm 
crises and earnings management behavior.  
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There is no consensus regarding the determinants of product harm crises. My prediction 
model largely depends on Kashmiri and Brower (2016) and Wowak, Mannor, and Wowak 
(2015). Specifically, I model the occurrence of a product harm crisis as a function of firm size 
(LogMV), leverage (LEV), operating performance (ROA), market-to-book ratio (MTB), sales 
growth (GROWTH), PPE relative to total assets (PPE), percentage of institutional shareholding 
(IO), analyst coverage (COVER), presence of COO among the five highest-paid executives 
(TMT), percentage of equity shares owned by the CEO (CEOSHARE), industry fixed effects, 
and year fixed effects.  
            Results of the probit regression regarding the determinants of product harm 
crises are tabulated in Panel A of Table 2. Following the suggestions from Shipman, Swanquish, 
and Whited (2017), the matching is performed on a one-to-one basis without replacement and 
without replacement. I also impose common support by dropping crisis firms whose propensity 
scores are higher than the maximum or less than the minimum propensity score of non-crisis 
firms and set the caliper to be 0.05.36  I find that the likelihood of experiencing product harm 
crises is positively associated with firm size, leverage, and PPE, and negatively associated with 
market-to-book ratio, sales growth, institutional shareholding, and the presence of COO among 
the five highest-paid executives. For each crisis firm, I choose the non-crisis firm with the 
closest propensity score as the control firm. This procedure yields 575 pairs of crisis firms and 
non-crisis firms. 
            To verify whether PSM alleviates the observable differences across crisis firms 
and non-crisis firms, I compare firm characteristics between matched crisis firms and non-crisis 
firms in Panel B of Table 2. On average, crisis firms in the matched sample are statistically 
indistinguishable from their matched non-crisis firms, except that crisis firms have a marginally 
lower median ROA and a marginally higher median PPE ratio. In general, the comparison 
                                               
36 As a robustness check, I vary the caliper between 0.1 and 0.03. My results remain unchanged.  
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suggests that my matching procedure achieves a covariate balance. The 575 pairs of crisis firms 
and non-crisis firms are used as my primary sample for the empirical analysis.  
[Insert Table 2] 
 
3.3.3 Measure of Earnings Management 
  Managers can time and engage in upward earnings management before the occurrence 
of product harm crisis. Prior studies document that managers can anticipate product harm crisis 
several months before announcing product recall publicly because managers have the 
opportunity to act strategically on when to cooperate with the regulatory agent to issue a recall 
(Chen et al 2009; Gao et al 2015; Gokalp, Keskek, Kumas, and Subasi 2016)37. Thus, even if 
a product harm crisis occurs in the fourth quarter, managers can still have ample time to engage 
in earnings management during the year before the fourth quarter of the year. For this reason, 
I focus on annual estimates rather than more granular quarterly estimates of earnings 
management.  
   Consistent with prior literature, I proxy income-increasing earnings management by 
signed performance-adjusted discretionary accruals (Kothari, Leone, and Wasley 2005; Mao 
and Renneboog 2015). Specifically, I estimate the following modified Jones model (Jones 1991) 
for each industry-year using all U.S. firms in Compustat with available information, where 
industry is defined by two-digit SIC codes: 
      
                                               
37 For the firms initiated recalls, after the manufacturer receive information about the potential hazard of the product from its 
customer, the manufacturer investigates whether the defect exist through its own analysis system which can take month before 
announcing a product recall publicly. Even if the recall was initiated by the regulatory agencies, the investigation period can 
still be lengthy and the manufacturer can have opportunity/time to act strategically to decide whether and when to cooperate 
with the regulators agencies to announce the product recalls (Chen et al 2009; Gao et al 2015; Gokalp, Keskek, Kumas, and 
Subasi 2016).  
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where for each firm i in year t, TACC is total accruals defined as income before extraordinary 
items minus operating cash flows; ASSET is total assets; is change of sales from t-1 
to t; is change of accounts receivable from t-1 to t; PPE is property, plant, and equipment; 
and ROA is return on assets measured as income before extraordinary items divided by total 
assets.38 Discretionary accruals (ABADD) are calculated as the difference between observed 
total accruals and predicted normal accruals based on the parameters estimated in the above 
regression.  
To the extent that the model remains incompletely specified for the firm-year 
experiencing product harm crisis, I expect that abnormal accruals arising from liability reserves 
and other accounts related to the product failure or defects are mostly income-decreasing39. As 
such, the measurement error in the residual term used to measure earnings management is likely 
to be biased downward, which is against finding a positive relation, as I expect. In a robustness 
test I examine later, I also use downward accounting restatements that are due to accounting 
frauds or GAAP misapplications to measure income-increasing earnings management.  
3.3.4 Empirical Model  
To test whether managers of firms experiencing a product crisis tend to engage in income-
increasing earnings management, I estimate the following regression using the matched sample:  
                                  
                                               
38 I specifically add ROA into the model because there are changes in current accruals that are closely tied to product harm 
crises that will reduce operating performance. For example, when a product recall happens, recalling firms may have to write 
off defective inventory, write off receivables against recall product, and record a current liability for expected refunds. Those 
income-deceasing accruals arise because of the event rather than management’s intentional manipulation. If operating 
performance is not controlled for when estimating the normal level of accruals, accruals intrinsically associated with product 
harm crises will be deemed as discretionary accruals, even though those accruals are non-discretionary in a setting of product 
harm crises.  
39 Under US GAAP, Statement of Financial Accounting Standards SFAS#5 cover codification for product recalls (Gokalp, 
et al., 2016). A firm must accrue a loss contingency when the management know that the liability had been incurred before 
the issuance of the financial statements and when the amount of the loss can be reasonably estimated. SFAS #5 
require firms specifically prohibits accruals for general or unspecified business risks such as reserves for 
general contingencies. Based on my browsing of financial statements, firms in the product harm crisis year do make a 
specific provision/reserve for the expenses associated with product recall (EX: Mattel 2007 Annual Report, General Motor 
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where for each firm i in year t, ABADD is signed discretionary accruals; PCRISIS is an indicator 
variable for product harm crisis; and Control represents a vector of control variables. Following 
the recommendations in Shipman et al. (2017), I include all covariates in the propensity score 
matching model as control variables in the regression. In addition, I add financial distress 
probability measured by Altman’s Z-score (ZSCORE), whether a firm is audited by a Big 4 
auditor (BIG4), whether a firm experiences restructuring (RESTR), and whether a firm has a 
write-off (WRITEOFF). Finally, I include industry fixed effects (IndFE). All variable 
definitions are summarized in the Appendix. Given that my sample has 11 years of data, 
standard errors are adjusted by double clustering at both firm and year level (Petersen 2009). I 
expect the coefficient on PCRISIS to be significant and positive if firms engage in income-
increasing earnings management when faced with a product harm crisis. 
 
3.4 RESULTS 
3.4.1 Main Regression Results 
    I first tabulate the correlations between variables used in the analysis (Table 3). 
PCRISIS appears to have a significantly positive correlation with ABADD. Untabulated 
univariate comparison suggests that the mean ABADD of crisis firms is -0.059, whereas the 
mean ABADD of matched non-crisis firms is -0.076, and the difference is statistically 
significant (t=3.111). In contrast, the mean ABADD of crisis firms (-0.071) is not statistically 
different from the mean ABADD of matched non-crisis firms (-0.078) when both firms are in 
non-crisis years (t=0.637). The correlation and comparison provide univariate evidence that 
crisis firms engage in income-increasing accruals management. The pair-wise correlations of 
PCRISIS and other controls, as well as those among the controls, are not large, suggesting that 
multicollinearity is not a serious concern in my regression model.  
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[Insert Table 3] 
 
       Table 4 provides the results of a multivariate regression. The coefficient on PCRISIS 
is significant and positive, indicating that having a product harm crisis is associated with 
significantly higher discretionary accruals. This result suggests that, compared with matched 
non-crisis firms, managers in crisis firms manipulate earnings upward using income-increasing 
discretionary accruals. In terms of economic significance, the result shows that crisis firms 
have an increase of 0.015 in discretionary accruals compared to matched non-crisis firms, 
which is equivalent to 1.5 percent of the lagged total assets. This number is economically 
material when compared to 5.2 percent, the mean value of ROA of the non-crisis firms. 
 [Insert Table 4] 
 
3.4.2 Robustness Checks 
3.4.2.1 Add Lagged Discretionary Accruals into PSM 
Prior literature finds that financial reporting quality influences firms’ investment and 
operational activities (Biddle, Hilary, and Verdi 2009; Cheng, Dhaliwal, and Zhang 2013; Feng, 
Li, McVay, and Skaife 2015). Hence, it is possible that firms having low-quality financial 
reporting are more likely to experience product harm crises. To address this concern, I re-match 
crisis firms with non-crisis firms using lagged discretionary accruals (ABADDt-1) as an 
additional covariate in the PSM. Including ABADDt-1 in PSM reduces the number of successful 
matches to 1,130 (i.e., 565 pairs of crisis firms and non-crisis firms). A covariate balance check 
confirms that, in the matched sample, crisis firms and non-crisis firms do not differ 
significantly in ABADDt-1. When I re-estimate the regression of ABADD on PCRISIS based on 
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this sample of 565 pairs of crisis firms and non-crisis firms, I find that the coefficient on 
PCRISIS remains significant and positive (coefficient=0.011, t=1.661, untabulated).  
 
3.4.2.2 Alternative Measures of Earnings Management  
I also use the downward accounting restatements that are due to accounting frauds or GAAP 
misapplication as an alternative measure of income-increasing earnings management. I obtain 
data on restatement from Audit Analytics. Results are presented in Table 5, in which RESTATE 
is an indicator variable that equals one if a firm’s financial statements in year t are subsequently 
restated downward, and zero otherwise. I only consider restatements caused by accounting 
issues and frauds that lead to overstated earnings, as my primary focus is on income-increasing 
earnings manipulation. I find that the tested variable PCRISIS has a significantly positive 
relation to RESTATE, suggesting that crisis firms are more likely to have downward accounting 
restatements than matched non-crisis firms. This result is consistent with firms managing 
earnings upward when faced with a product harm crisis. 
[Insert Table 5] 
 
To test the robustness of my results, and given different model specifications for 
estimating discretionary accruals (Dechow, Ge, Schrand 2010), I also use alternative measures 
of discretionary accruals including (1) the modified cross-sectional Jones model (Jones 1991) 
proposed by Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney (1995) and used by Dechow, Richardson, and Tuna 
(2003); (2) the performance-matched modified Jones model (Jones 1991) proposed by Kothari 
et al. (2005); and (3) the cross-sectional Dechow and Dichev (2002) model as modified by 
McNichols (2002) and used by Ball and Shivakumar (2006). My findings remain unchanged 




3.4.2.3 Firms with Multiple Product Harm Crises  
Some firms experience more than one product harm crises in the sample period. To make sure 
my results are not driven by the firms experiencing repeated product harm crises, I control for 
the number of product harm crises that a firm experienced during the sample period. Adding 
this variable to the regression does not change my results. In addition, I re-estimate the 
regression using only firms experiencing a first-year product harm crisis. A firm is defined as 
experiencing a first-year product harm crisis if it experiences a product harm crisis in year t but 
has not experienced any product harm crisis in year t-1 and t-2. I identify 139 first-year product 
harm crises. As presented in Table 6, using the 139 first-year crisis firms and their matched 
non-crisis firms, I still find a significant positive relation between product harm crises and 
signed discretionary accruals.  
[Insert Table 6] 
 
3.5 ADDITIONAL ANALYSES 
3.5.1 Effect of Earnings Management on Likelihood of Losing Major Clients 
I argue that, when faced with a product harm crisis, firms manage earnings upward as a way to 
assure customers regarding the firm’s financial viability and ability to honor future implicit 
claims. If this argument holds, it is logical to expect that income-increasing earnings 
management behavior should be somehow effective in retaining customers’ confidence. 
Arguably, customers cannot easily discern earnings management done by managers, or it is too 
costly for them to do so. To test this prediction, I investigate whether income-increasing 
earnings management in the crisis year helps crisis firms retain major customers in the year 
following the product harm crisis.  
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I report the results in Table 7. The dependent variable is LOSSCLIENT, which equals 
one if a firm loses at least one major client in the following year, and zero otherwise. I use the 
customer database from the Segment File of Compustat to identify firms’ major customers. 
Using matched non-crisis firms as the benchmark, I find that income-increasing earnings 
management significantly reduces the likelihood of losing major clients for crisis firms, which 
manifests itself as a significantly negative coefficient on the interaction term ABADD*PCRISIS. 
Such a result provides corroborating evidence of managers’ incentives to manipulate earnings 
upward when a product harm crisis occurs, as doing so help the managers retain customers, at 
least in a short term.  
[Insert Table 7] 
 
3.5.2 Effect of Earnings Management on Likelihood of CEO’s Forced Turnover and 
Bonus Decrease 
My second argument suggests that CEOs manipulate earnings upward to alleviate the personal 
losses associated with product harm crises. To verify this argument, I focus on two measures 
of personal losses: (1) the likelihood of being forced to exit following the crisis year and (2) 
the likelihood of having a bonus cut in the crisis year.40 I test whether income-increasing 
earnings manipulation reduces such likelihood. Earnings are shown to affect boards’ decisions 
on CEOs’ forced turnovers (Engel et al. 2003) and bonus compensation (Healy 1985) and, 
hence, earnings management can, in turn, affect such decisions. I do not focus on new option 
grants because it is less clear whether managers prefer upward earnings management, since it 
                                               
40 I focus on bonus decreases from t-1 to t because bonus is closely related to current period earnings. As a result, I expect 
that CEOs manipulate earnings in the crisis year t to avoid the loss in bonus due to decreased earnings caused by the product 
harm crisis. However, CEO turnover usually happens with a lag, and hence I focus on the CEO turnover in the year following 
the crisis year.  
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can potentially increase the exercise prices of the options, making them less in-the-money in 
the future.  
I obtain CEOs’ bonus compensation and turnover data from ExecuComp database. If a 
CEO’s bonus decreases from year t-1 to t, given t as the crisis year, the variable DE_BONUS 
is coded as 1, and 0 otherwise. The dependent variable CEO_FIRE is equal to 1 if a CEO was 
dismissed, and zero otherwise. I consider that a CEO forced turnover occurs in year t+1, i.e., 
the year following the crisis year, if the CEO identification number for a company in 
ExecuComp changes from t+1 to t+2. Among them, I exclude cases where the turnover reason 
provided in ExecuComp is “deceased” or “retirement.”  
Regression results are tabulated in Table 8. Again, I use matched non-crisis firms as the 
benchmark. Columns (1) and (2) report the results for CEO bonus cut and CEO forced turnover, 
respectively. The variable of interest is the interaction term between PCRISIS and ABADD. In 
both regressions, PCRISIS*ABADD appears significantly negative, suggesting that the more 
income-increasing earnings management is conducted by a CEO in a product harm crisis, the 
less likely the CEO will experience a reduction in bonus in the crisis year, and the less likely 
the CEO will be dismissed in the year following the crisis year. The result provides further 
evidence supporting my arguments that CEOs are incentivized to manipulate earnings upward 
when faced with a product harm crisis, as doing so indeed alleviates CEOs’ personal costs 
associated with the product harm crisis.  
[Insert Table 8] 
 
3.5.3 Cross-Sectional Variation 
While I find a positive relation between product harm crises and income-increasing earnings 
management, I expect some cross-sectional variation in such a relation. In this section, I explore 
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a number of cross-sectional variations of earnings management incentives induced by the 
relative importance of reputation and implicit claims, as well as by CEOs’ fears of personal 
losses occasioned by product harm crises.  
 
3.5.3.1 Importance of Firm Reputation and Implicit Claims 
Since a product harm crisis causes damages to a firm’s reputation and hence customers’ 
perception of the firm’s ability to fulfill its implicit claims, when reputation and implicit claims 
are particularly important to the firm, managers should have stronger incentives to manipulate 
earnings upward to rescue the firm’s reputation and customers’ confidence. To test this 
hypothesis, I use two variables to proxy the importance of reputation and implicit claims: 
whether a firm has industrial customers, and whether a firm produces durable goods.  
Prior studies in the marketing literature consistently show that industrial customers are 
different from consumer customers. Industrial customers often buy large quantities of 
goods/services to incorporate them as inputs into their own production processes. As a result, 
industrial customers need higher-quality products and longer-term supplies of parts and service 
after sales than consumer customers (Industrial Marketing Committee Review Board 1954). 
As such, firms with industrial customers are more dependent on their reputation to fulfill 
implicit claims than firms with consumer costumers. Industrial customers are also more likely 
to be in long-term relationships with their supplier firms, and are thus likely to rely on financial 
performance of the supplier firm to decide their explicit trade terms, as well as their 
relationship-specific investments (Hui et al. 2012; Costello et al. 2013). Therefore, upward 
earnings management incentive is expected to be higher for firms who have industrial 
customers.  
In addition, firms producing durable goods have greater implicit claims with their 
customers than firms producing non-durable goods (Bowen et al. 1995). This is because 
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durable products have long lives, resulting in the customers purchasing durable products often 
requiring the long-term supply of parts and services. Bowen et al. (1995) find that firms in 
durable goods industries choose more income-increasing accounting methods to influence 
customers’ perception of the firms’ long-term viability and stability. Similarly, Titman and 
Wessels (1988) find that firms in durable goods industries opt to have a lower leverage ratio in 
order to signal lower bankruptcy risk to their customers.  
Following Su et al. (2014), I consider that firms reporting at least one “Company” type 
of customer in the customer database from the Segment File of Compustat as having industrial 
customers. I divide the sample into subsamples with company customers and subsamples 
without company customers. I measure firms producing durable goods by the firms’ primary 
industry. Similar to Bowen et al. (1995) and Su et al. (2014), I separate firms into durable goods 
industries (three-digit SIC codes 245, 250-259, 283, 301, and 324-399) and non-durable goods 
industries (all remaining SIC codes from two-digit SIC codes 20 to 39). I re-match the crisis 
firms and non-crisis firms within the subsamples and re-estimate the regression using 
subsamples. Results are tabulated in Panel A, Table 9. Columns (1) and (2) report the results 
when the importance of reputation and implicit claims are measured by the existence of 
company customers and durable goods, respectively. As shown in the table, the coefficient on 
PCRISIS is only significantly positive for firms having company customers and for firms 
producing durable goods, consistent with managers’ earnings management incentives being 
stronger in a product harm crisis when reputation and implicit claims are particularly important 
to the firm. 
[Insert Table 9] 
 
3.5.3.2 CEO Equity Incentive and Career Concern 
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Product harm crises can severely affect managerial wealth through their impact on share prices. 
In that context, managers with significant option or equity holdings from the firm may have 
particular incentives to engage in earnings management following a product harm crisis. 
Moreover, CEOs face differential career concerns, with newly appointed CEOs being more 
likely than CEOs with a longer tenure to suffer greater expected loss as a result of a product 
harm crisis. 
I use CEO equity incentive (delta) to measure the earnings management incentive 
induced by the CEO’s equity portfolio. Following Core and Guay (2002), CEO equity incentive 
is calculated as the sensitivity of the value of a CEO’s equity portfolio to changes in stock price, 
using data from ExecuComp. I separate the sample into firms with high CEO equity incentive 
and low CEO equity incentive, based on the sample median value of equity incentive. 
Following Ali and Zhang (2015), I use CEO tenure to proxy the degree of a CEO’s career 
concern. CEOs are more concerned about their career when they are in the early years of their 
services and, hence, CEOs with a shorter tenure are considered as having greater career 
concerns. I do not include CEOs who were in the first year of their tenure, as Ali and Zhang 
(2015) document a strong incentive of CEOs to take a big bath after they are just appointed, 
which is likely to confound the results. Panel B of Table 9 reports the regression results. It 
shows that firms with CEOs having a higher equity incentive engage in more extensive income-
increasing earnings management than firms with CEOs having a lower equity incentive. 
Similarly, firms with CEOs having a stronger career concern exhibit a higher level of earnings 
management than firms with CEOs having a weaker career concern. Collectively, the cross-
sectional analyses shed further light on the relation between product harm crises and earnings 
management. Evidence in the cross-sectional tests supports the two major incentives for 




3.5.4 Severity of Product Harm Crisis 
I also expect that, when the severity of product harm crisis is greater, which is more likely to 
harm customers’ confidence, managers have greater incentive to engage in earnings 
management. I measure the severity of a crisis based on a subsample of medical device firms 
whose severity of product recalls are publicly available on the website of the U.S. Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA). I manually collect the information of the severity of product 
recalls and merge it with my initial crisis sample to identify 248 crisis firm-years. The FDA 
classifies the severity of product recalls into Class I, Class II, and Class III, with Class I recalls 
being the most severe and Class III being the least severe. I accordingly construct a variable 
SEVERITY, which takes the value of 3 for Class I recalls, 2 for Class II recalls, and 1 for Class 
III recalls. As shown in Table 10, I find a significant positive relation between SEVERITY and 
ABADD, consistent with managers’ earnings manipulation incentives being stronger when the 
product harm crisis is more severe, and thus the negative influence on customers’ confidence 
is more pronounced.  
[Insert Table 10] 
 
3.5.5 Earnings Components Used to Manage Earnings 
To shed further light on the accounts that managers use to manipulate earnings upward, I break 
down total earnings into core earnings (measured as operating earnings after depreciation), 
special item, and non-operating earnings.41 I break down earnings into these three items to 
reflect the ways that firms use to recognize the direct costs associated with product harm crises. 
Results in Table 11 show that the coefficient of PCRISIS is not associated, negatively 
associated, and positively associated with core earnings, special item, and non-operating 
                                               
41 All these components can be parts of the total accruals and, in turn, become part of the discretionary accruals.  
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earnings, respectively. This is consistent with my expectation and some anecdotal evidence 
that firms use transactions and recognition of such transactions that affect non-operating 
earnings in order to manage earnings.42 For example, product harm crisis firms may recognize 
the gains on the sales of assets and/or investments to increase non-operating earnings. It is not 
surprising that special item is negatively associated with product harm crisis because many 
direct costs associated with product harm crisis, such as discontinuation of operation, inventory, 
and receivable write-offs, can be recorded as expenses in special item. Core earnings are not 
statistically related to product harm crises, probably because, although direct costs associated 
with product harm crises negatively impact core earnings, it is likely that, due to the disposal 
of assets and discontinuation of operations, as well as large write-offs of receivables, firms 
save on depreciation expenses43 and/or bad debt expenses, which helps offset the negative 
impact on core earnings. These additional analyses are indicative of what accounts are used for 
firms to engage in earnings management in the face of product harm crises.  
                            [Insert Table 11] 
 
3.6 CONCLUSION 
Given the increasing number of product harm crises in recent years and the severe 
consequences of product harm crises, a number of studies have investigated firms’ strategies 
to protect a firm’s reputation/brand equity when a product harm crisis happens. I investigate 
firms’ reaction to product harm crises from the financial reporting perspective. I identify 
several incentives to manipulate earnings in a product harm crisis, and document that managers 
                                               
42 For example, the Wall Street Journal online reports that “Kellogg Co. said it would take a charge of up to $30 million to 
cover the recall of Mini-Wheats cereal in the U.S. due to possible contamination by pieces of metal mesh, but maintain its 
existing full-year earnings’ guidance of $3.18 to $3.30 a share …. Kellogg said the performance by its recently acquired 
Pringles snack business and changes in estimates for some non-operating items would offset the recall expenses” (emphasis 
added) in 2012 (Tomson and Ziobro 2012). 
43 When I separately examine depreciation expense as the dependent variable, I do observe a negative association between 
product harm crisis and depreciation expense, which is consistent with my conjecture here.  
76 
 
manipulate earnings upward when they are faced with a product harm crisis. I also show that 
crisis firms are more likely to have restatements of financial statements. Consistent with firms’ 
financial image influencing customers’ perception of firms’ ability to honor future implicit 
claims and, hence, their purchase intention, the income-increasing earnings management helps 
crisis firms retain large customers in the short term. It also reduces the propensity for CEOs to 
have bonus cuts and forced turnovers. Cross-sectional analyses are consistent with the 
identified incentives to manipulate earnings. That is, the incentive to manipulate earnings is 
greater when the implicit claims to customers are greater and when the CEOs’ personal wealth 
and career concerns are more affected by the product harm crises. Overall, findings in this 
study are informative about the implications of the product harm crises on firms’ financial 
reporting behavior and financial reporting quality.  
This study has its caveat. The discretionary accrual model used in the study to measure 
earnings management is not without noise. Although I use the alternative measure such as 
accounting misstatement, the sample size in my study is also reduced. Regarding the future 
studies, scholars can investigate whether managers will also use voluntary disclosures to 
manipulate customers’ perception during the product harm crisis. Unlike earnings management, 
voluntary disclosure can provide more timely information to the outsiders, so it is very likely 
firms will use voluntary disclosure along with earnings manipulating to boost the customers’ 
confidence as well as investors’ confidence.  
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Variable  Definitions 
ABADD 
Discretionary accruals calculated based on performance-
adjusted modified Jones model using all firms with available 
information in Compustat  
BIG4 An indicator variable equal to 1 if a firm is audited by a Big 4 audit firm, and 0 otherwise 
CASH Cash ratio, calculated as total cash and cash equivalent to total assets 
CEO_FIRE An indicator variable  is equal to 1 if a CEO was dismissed, and zero otherwise 
CEOSHARE Percentage of equity shares owned by the CEO  
chgROA  Change in ROA from t-1 to t 
CORE Core earnings measured as operating incomes after depreciation 
COVER Logarithm of analyst coverage 
DE_BONUS 
If a CEO’s bonus decreases from year t-1 to t, given t as the 
crisis year, the variable DE_BONUS is coded as 1, and 0 
otherwise 
FIRST_PCRISIS 
An indicator variable for firms experiencing a product harm 
crisis in the first year. A firm is defined to have a first-year 
product harm crisis in year t if it has not had any product 
harm crises in year t-1 and t-2 
GROWTH Sales growth, calculated as sales in year t minus sales in year t-1 divided by sales in year t-1 
IO Percentage of shares owned by institutional shareholders 
LEV Leverage ratio calculated as total long-term debt to total assets 
LogMV Logarithm of total market value 
LOSSCLIENT An indicator variable equal to 1 if a firm lost a major client, and 0 otherwise 
MTB Market-to-book ratio, calculated as year-end market value to total common equity 
NonOP Non-operating incomes 
PCRISIS An indicator variable equal to 1 if a firm experienced product crisis in year t, and 0 otherwise 
PPE Gross property, plant, and equipment divided by total assets 
RESTATE 
An indicator variable equal to 1 if a firm’s financial 
statements are restated due to accounting issues and fraud 
that lead to overstated earnings, and 0 otherwise 
RESTR An indicator variable equal to 1 if a firm has non-zero restructuring expenses, and equal to 0 otherwise.  
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ROA Return on assets calculated as income before extraordinary items to total assets 
SEVERITY 
Severity of product harm crises for a subsample of medical 
device companies based on the product recall classification 
from the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 
SPECIAL Special items 
TACC TACC is total accruals defined as income before extraordinary items minus operating cash flows 
TMT 
An indicator variable equal to 1 if the Chief Operating 
Officer (COO) is among the five highest-paid executives, 
and 0 otherwise 
DAR Change in account receivables from t-1 to t 
DSALES Change in sales from t-1 to t 
WRITEOFF An indicator variable equal to 1 if a firm has non-zero write-offs, and 0 otherwise 




Sample Distribution and Descriptive Statistics of Pooled Sample 
 
Panel A: Sample Distribution by Year 
Year No. of Observations  No. of Observations With Product Harm Crises 
2002 248 28 
2003 275 30 
2004 653 47 
2005 667 53 
2006 649 56 
2007 661 64 
2008 687 72 
2009 736 71 
2010 745 91 
2011 753 67 
2012 732 62 




Table 1 – cont’d  
 
Panel B: Sample Distribution by Industry 
Two-digit 
SIC Code Industry Name 
No. of 
Observations 
No. of Observations With 
Product Harm Crises 
20 Food and Kindred Products 399 44 
22 Textile Mill Products 32 3 
25 25 Furniture and Fixtures  150 2 
26 Paper and Allied Products  206 22 
27 Printing, Publishing, and Allied Industries  156 1 
28 Chemicals and Allied Products  1,180 231 
29 Petroleum Refining and Related Industries  99 1 
30 Rubber and Miscellaneous Plastics Products 138 24 
32 Stone, Clay, and Glass Products 93 20 
33 Primary Metal Industries 223 6 
34 Fabricated Metal Products 233 39 
35 Industrial Machinery and Equipment 1,049 66 
36 Electronic and Other Electric Equipment 1,309 38 
37 Transportation Equipment 380 37 
38 Instruments and Related Products 1,005 83 
39 Miscellaneous Manufacturing Industries 154 24 
Total   6,806 641 
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Table 1 – cont’d  
 
Panel C: Descriptive Statistics of Crisis Firms and Non-Crisis Firms in Pooled Sample 
    
Crisis Firm Group 
 (No. of Obs.=641)   
Non-Crisis Firm Group 
 (No. of Obs.=6,165)     
  
Variables  Mean Median 
 Mean Median  Mean Difference Median Difference  
LogMV  8.765 8.514  7.119 6.969  1.646*** 1.545*** 
LEV  0.199 0.186  0.157 0.122  0.042*** 0.064*** 
ROA  0.059 0.062  0.024 0.052  0.035*** 0.010*** 
GROWTH  3.212 2.747  2.922 2.122  0.290** 0.625*** 
MTB  0.042 0.055  0.066 0.070  -0.024*** -0.015*** 
IO  0.718 0.730  0.731 0.770  -0.013 -0.039*** 
COVER  1.759 2.234  1.326 1.540  0.432*** 0.693*** 
TMT  0.251 0.000  0.296 0.000  -0.045** 0.000 
CEOSHARE  0.733 0.021  1.447 0.038  -0.714*** -0.017*** 
PPE   0.514 0.446   0.488 0.406   0.027** 0.039*** 
 
*, **, *** indicate two-tailed statistical significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.  
Panel A provides yearly distribution of the pooled sample of manufacturing firms (SIC codes 20-39) and firms with product harm crises in the 
pooled sample. A manufacturing industry is included in the pooled sample if at least one firm in the industry experienced a product harm crisis 
in the sample period 2002 to 2012. Panel B presents the sample distribution based on industry membership defined by two-digit SIC codes. 
Panel C provides descriptive statistics of 641 firm-year observations with product harm crises and 6,165 firm-years observations without product 




Propensity Score Matching 
 
Panel A: Determinants of Experiencing Product Harm Crises for Propensity Score 
Matching 
 
  Dependent Variable = PCRISIS 
Variables  Coefficient  z-statistics 
LogMV 0.353*** (19.036) 
LEV 0.476*** (2.945) 
ROA 0.223 (0.884) 
MTB -0.025*** (-3.439) 
GROWTH -0.662*** (-3.971) 
IO -0.500*** (-3.872) 
COVER -0.011 (-0.509) 
TMT -0.135** (-2.459) 
CEOSHARE -0.005 (-0.770) 
PPE 0.197** (2.263) 
CONSTANT -4.202*** (-17.442) 
   
Industry Fixed Effect Yes  
Year Fixed Effect Yes  
Observations 6,806  




Table 2 – cont’d  
 
Panel B: Test of Covariate Balance of Propensity Score Matched Sample 
    
Crisis Firm Group 
(No. of Obs.=575)   
Non-Crisis Firm 
Group  
(No. of Obs.=575) 
    
  
Variables  Mean Median 
 Mean Median  Mean Difference Median Difference  
LogMV  8.467 8.261  8.468 8.339  -0.001 -0.078 
LEV  0.203 0.189  0.204 0.177  -0.001 0.013 
ROA  0.056 0.059  0.052 0.070  0.004 -0.010* 
GROWTH  3.186 2.607  3.170 2.599  0.017 0.008 
MTB  0.043 0.057  0.041 0.057  0.002 0.001 
IO  0.726 0.750  0.719 0.761  0.007 -0.011 
COVER  1.643 2.069  1.564 1.981  0.079 0.088 
TMT  0.278 0.000  0.273 0.000  0.005 0.000 
CEOSHARE  0.815 0.035  0.955 0.020  -0.140 0.015 
PPE   0.519 0.452   0.524 0.422   -0.005 0.030* 
 
*, **, *** indicate two-tailed statistical significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. Z-statistics are reported in parentheses.  
Panel A presents the results of probit regression of the determinants of experiencing product harm crises. The probit regression is used to 
perform the propensity score matching. Panel B provides the same set of descriptive statistics as in Panel C of Table 1 for 575 pairs of crisis 






  Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1 ABADD                
2 PCRISIS 0.10               
3 LogMV -0.26 0.00              
4 LEV 0.10 0.00 -0.05             
5 ROA -0.25 0.02 0.38 -0.18            
6 MTB -0.13 0.00 0.24 -0.09 0.17           
7 GROWTH -0.10 0.01 0.11 -0.06 0.25 0.10          
8 IO -0.02 0.02 -0.01 0.11 0.05 -0.05 0.05         
9 COVER -0.14 0.03 0.43 0.00 0.08 0.15 0.05 0.04        
10 TMT 0.10 -0.01 -0.06 0.12 0.07 -0.01 0.04 -0.02 -0.03       
11 CEOSHARE -0.12 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.09 0.06 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.01      
12 PPE -0.04 -0.02 -0.18 -0.10 0.02 -0.03 0.05 -0.15 -0.14 -0.01 -0.03     
13 ZSCORE -0.18 -0.14 0.05 -0.50 0.32 0.24 0.16 -0.10 0.06 -0.12 -0.02 0.07    
14 BIG4 0.03 0.01 0.25 0.05 0.11 -0.01 0.03 -0.05 0.07 0.14 0.03 -0.07 -0.15   
15 RESTR 0.06 0.13 0.04 0.17 -0.10 -0.07 -0.14 0.10 -0.01 0.09 0.03 -0.05 -0.28 0.16  
16 WRITEOFF -0.06 0.03 0.07 0.05 -0.10 0.00 -0.03 0.02 0.06 0.01 0.00 -0.02 -0.07 -0.04 0.15 
 
This table presents the Pearson correlation between variables used in the main regression. Correlations significant at the 5 percent level are in boldface. 




Effect of Product Harm Crises on Earnings Management 
 
  Dependent Variable = ABADD 
Variables Coefficient t-statistic 
PCRISIS 0.015*** (2.624) 
LogMV -0.005 (-1.513) 
LEV 0.026 (1.039) 
ROA -0.178* (-1.947) 
MTB -0.000 (-0.330) 
GROWTH -0.010 (-0.353) 
IO -0.022 (-1.429) 
COVER -0.004 (-1.451) 
PPE 0.027 (1.254) 
TMT -0.010 (-1.254) 
CEOSHARE -0.002* (-1.803) 
ZSCORE -0.001 (-1.158) 
BIG4 0.003 (0.658) 
RESTR -0.002 (-0.368) 
WRITEOFF -0.003 (-0.453) 
CONSTANT 0.039 (1.066) 
   
Industry Fixed Effect Yes  
Firm/Year Cluster Yes  
Observations 1,150  
Adjusted R-squared 0.350   
 
*, **, *** indicate two-tailed statistical significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. T-
statistics are reported in parentheses. 
This table presents the results of regression on the effect of experiencing product harm crises on 
accrual earnings management, based on propensity score matched pairs of crisis and non-crisis firms. 




Effect of Product Harm Crises on Likelihood of Restatement 
 
  Dependent Variable = RESTATE 
Variables Coefficient z-statistic 
PCRISIS 0.260* (1.703) 
LogMV 0.012 (0.256) 
LEV 0.204 (0.379) 
ROA 0.424 (0.659) 
MTB -0.024 (-0.950) 
GROWTH 0.265 (0.729) 
IO 0.478 (1.409) 
COVER 0.020 (0.388) 
PPE -0.458 (-1.336) 
TMT 0.285 (1.348) 
CEOSHARE -0.004 (-0.471) 
ZSCORE -0.076** (-2.445) 
BIG4 0.029 (0.155) 
RESTR -0.000 (-0.002) 
WRITEOFF 0.043 (0.351) 
CONSTANT -1.774*** (-3.073) 
   
Industry Fixed Effects Yes  
Firm/Year Cluster Yes  
Observations 1,091  
Pseudo R-squared 0.117   
 
*, **, *** indicate two-tailed statistical significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, 
respectively. Z-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
This table presents the results of probit regression on the effect of experiencing product harm 
crises on restatements due to accounting issues and fraud. Dependent variable RESTATE 
equals one if the restatement has a negative impact on earnings/assets (i.e., restatement is due 




Analysis of First-Year Product Harm Crises 
   
  Dependent Variable = ABADD 
Variables Coefficient t-statistic 
FIRST_PCRISIS 0.015* (1.836) 
LogMV -0.002 (-0.495) 
LEV 0.008 (0.137) 
ROA -0.277* (-1.703) 
MTB -0.002 (-1.066) 
GROWTH -0.019 (-0.260) 
IO -0.003 (-0.148) 
COVER 0.003 (0.539) 
PPE 0.012 (0.583) 
TMT -0.025*** (-2.724) 
CEOSHARE -0.000 (-0.649) 
ZSCORE -0.001 (-0.531) 
BIG4 0.008 (0.839) 
RESTR -0.004 (-0.438) 
WRITEOFF -0.019* (-1.831) 
CONSTANT 0.044 (0.913) 
   
Industry Fixed Effect Yes  
Firm/Year Cluster Yes  
Observations 278  
Adjusted R-squared 0.441   
 
*, **, *** indicate two-tailed statistical significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, 
respectively. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
This table presents the regression results based on first-year crisis firms and their matched 




Effect of Earnings Management on Likelihood of Losing Major Clients 
for Crisis Firms 
 
  Dependent Variable = LOSSCLIENTt+1 
Variables Coefficient t-statistic 
ABADD -0.168 (-1.343) 
PCRISIS 1.032 (1.426) 
ABADD*PCRISIS -2.774** (-2.495) 
LogMV -0.067 (-1.424) 
LEV -0.275 (-0.841) 
chgROA 0.980*** (2.751) 
MTB 0.020 (1.562) 
GROWTH -0.114 (-0.607) 
IO -0.555* (-1.869) 
COVER 0.055 (0.939) 
PPE 0.276 (1.108) 
TMT 0.137 (0.861) 
CEOSHARE -0.015 (-1.253) 
ZSCORE 0.001 (0.095) 
BIG4 -0.329** (-2.336) 
RESTR -0.095 (-1.001) 
WRITEOFF 0.119* (1.660) 
CONSTANT 0.423 (0.813) 
   
Industry Fixed Effect Yes  
Firm/Year Cluster Yes  
Observations 1,146  
Pseudo R-squared 0.081   
 
*, **, *** indicate two-tailed statistical significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, 
respectively. Z-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
This table presents the results of the effect of earnings management on the likelihood of 
losing major clients in year t+1, given t as the crisis year. Regressions are estimated using 






Effect of Earnings Management on Likelihood of CEO Bonus Decrease and CEO 
Dismissal 
 
  (1) (2) 
 
Dependent Variable = 
DE_BONUSt 
Dependent Variable = 
CEO_FIREt+1 
Variables Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic 
PCRISIS -0.008 (-0.059) -0.103 (-0.866) 
ABADD 0.647 (0.705) 0.115 (0.127) 
ABADD*PCRISIS -1.691** (-2.046) -1.724* (-1.825) 
LogMV 0.036 (0.735) 0.006 (0.094) 
LEV 0.676 (1.342) 0.598 (1.034) 
chgROA 0.059 (0.061) -0.914* (-1.673) 
MTB -0.024*** (-2.780) -0.022* (-1.740) 
GROWTH 0.081 (0.161) -0.245 (-0.695) 
IO -0.852** (-2.097) 0.065 (0.106) 
COVER -0.031 (-0.813) -0.033 (-1.066) 
PPE 0.052 (0.234) -0.100 (-0.505) 
TMT 0.041 (0.460) -0.252*** (-5.428) 
CEOSHARE 0.015 (1.108) 0.020 (1.410) 
ZSCORE 0.010 (0.449) 0.003 (0.196) 
BIG4 -0.295* (-1.936) 0.394** (2.024) 
RESTR -0.157** (-2.136) -0.237* (-1.818) 
WRITEOFF 0.057 (0.640) 0.446*** (4.795) 
CONSTANT -0.013 (-0.024) -1.445** (-2.382) 
     
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Firm/Year Cluster Yes Yes 
Observations 1010 894 
Pseudo R-squared 0.043 0.043 
 
*, **, *** indicate two-tailed statistical significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, 
respectively. Z-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
Column (1) of this table presents the results of the effect of earnings management on the 
likelihood of CEOs suffering a decrease in bonus from year t-1 to t, given t as the crisis year. 
Column (2) reports the results of the effect of earnings management on the likelihood of CEO 
dismissal in year t+1, given t as the crisis year. Regressions are estimated using propensity 
score matched crisis and non-crisis firms. See Appendix A for variable definitions. 
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Table 9: Cross-Sectional Variation 
Panel A: Importance of Implicit Claims to Customers 
 
  Customer Importance Type of Goods Produced 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Without Company 
Customer With Company Customer Non-Durable Goods Durable Goods 
Variable Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic 
PCRISIS 0.006 (0.929) 0.024*** (3.672) 0.001 (0.122) 0.015** (2.510) 
LogMV -0.006* (-1.742) -0.005 (-1.631) -0.006* (-1.787) -0.011*** (-4.650) 
LEV -0.021 (-0.692) 0.061** (1.970) 0.041* (1.690) 0.045* (1.858) 
ROA -0.264*** (-3.140) -0.091 (-1.026) 0.157** (2.378) -0.050 (-0.768) 
MTB -0.001 (-0.889) 0.000 (0.528) -0.001 (-1.223) 0.001 (1.414) 
GROWTH -0.026 (-0.567) 0.000 (0.009) 0.005 (0.068) 0.008 (0.361) 
IO -0.003 (-0.146) -0.021 (-1.168) 0.020 (0.822) -0.019 (-1.118) 
COVER -0.006* (-1.775) -0.002 (-0.492) -0.005* (-1.694) 0.001 (0.250) 
PPE 0.019 (0.724) 0.024 (0.989) 0.037 (1.393) -0.027 (-1.107) 
TMT -0.027*** (-2.987) -0.002 (-0.172) -0.011* (-1.674) -0.017** (-2.014) 
CEOSHARE -0.003*** (-2.681) 0.000 (0.584) -0.002 (-0.934) -0.001 (-1.489) 
ZSCORE -0.000 (-0.184) -0.002 (-1.196) -0.009** (-2.333) -0.001 (-1.475) 
BIG4 0.004 (0.800) -0.002 (-0.300) -0.009 (-0.752) 0.002 (0.387) 
RESTR 0.004 (0.376) -0.007 (-1.095) -0.009 (-0.779) 0.010 (1.339) 
WRITEOFF 0.009 (1.590) -0.011 (-1.460) 0.003 (0.448) -0.008 (-1.139) 
CONSTANT 0.064* (1.870) 0.019 (0.509) 0.064 (1.439) 0.075** (2.305) 
         
Industry Fixed Effect Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Firm/Year Cluster Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Observations 494  656  388  726  




Table 9 – cont’d  
 
Panel B: CEO Equity Incentive and CEO Career Concern  
  CEO Equity Incentive (Delta) CEO Career Concern 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Low Delta High Delta Low Career Concern High Career Concern 
Variable Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic 
PCRISIS 0.006 (0.859) 0.015** (2.112) 0.004 (0.736) 0.027* (1.952) 
LogMV -0.003 (-0.331) -0.008** (-2.171) -0.009*** (-2.651) -0.014*** (-3.656) 
LEV -0.028 (-0.580) 0.057** (2.239) 0.077** (2.370) -0.065 (-0.904) 
ROA 0.099 (1.419) -0.013 (-0.079) -0.039 (-0.500) -0.010 (-0.070) 
MTB 0.003 (1.378) -0.002** (-2.378) -0.001 (-0.607) -0.001 (-1.152) 
GROWTH -0.002 (-0.085) -0.023 (-0.983) -0.010 (-0.252) -0.050 (-1.620) 
IO 0.016 (0.506) 0.004 (0.201) 0.019 (1.084) -0.030 (-0.928) 
COVER 0.003 (1.003) -0.008*** (-3.319) -0.002 (-0.792) 0.002 (0.536) 
PPE -0.012 (-0.542) 0.039* (1.912) 0.031* (1.796) 0.030 (1.526) 
TMT 0.000 (0.025) -0.011* (-1.774) -0.020*** (-2.781) -0.008 (-0.739) 
CEOSHARE 0.010 (0.919) -0.001 (-0.839) -0.002 (-1.175) -0.002** (-2.447) 
ZSCORE -0.006*** (-3.382) -0.002 (-1.464) -0.001 (-1.485) -0.004 (-1.451) 
BIG4 0.018 (1.639) -0.008 (-0.810) -0.005 (-0.666) 0.001 (0.083) 
RESTR 0.011 (1.284) 0.001 (0.161) 0.016* (1.745) 0.000 (0.020) 
WRITEOFF -0.016** (-2.029) -0.007 (-1.093) 0.004 (0.550) -0.008 (-0.883) 
CONSTANT 0.000 (0.004) 0.062* (1.937) 0.046 (1.410) 0.142* (1.850) 
         
Industry Fixed Effect Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Firm/Year Cluster Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Observations 342  662  570  220  
R-squared 0.320   0.451   0.463   0.444   
 
*, **, *** indicate two-tailed statistical significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
Panel A presents the regression results regarding the effect of the importance of firm reputation and implicit claims on the relationship between 
product harm crises and managers’ incentives to manipulate earnings upward. A firm is defined as having a company customer if a company-
type customer is reported for this company in the Compustat customer segment file. A firm is considered as producing durable goods if it has a 
three-digit SIC code of 245, 250-259, 283, 301, or 324-399. Panel B reports the regression results regarding the effect of CEOs’ concerns of 
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personal costs on the relationship between product harm crises and managers’ incentives to manipulate earnings upward. CEO compensation 





Analysis of Severity of Product Harm Crises 
 
  Dependent Variable = ABADD 
Variables Coefficient t-statistic 
SEVERITY 0.017** (1.978) 
LogMV -0.013** (-2.505) 
LEV -0.018 (-0.554) 
ROA -0.199*** (-2.993) 
MTB -0.001 (-0.274) 
GROWTH 0.170** (2.245) 
IO -0.047* (-1.943) 
COVER -0.003* (-1.689) 
PPE -0.041 (-0.834) 
TMT -0.011* (-1.873) 
CEOSHARE -0.001 (-0.592) 
ZSCORE -0.002* (-1.840) 
BIG4 0.013 (1.370) 
RESTR 0.004 (0.575) 
WRITEOFF -0.022* (-1.652) 
CONSTANT 0.045 (0.905) 
   
Industry Fixed Effect Yes  
Firm/Year Cluster Yes  
Observations 248  
Adjusted R-squared 0.382   
 
*, **, *** indicate two-tailed statistical significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. T-
statistics are reported in parentheses. 
This table presents the regression results on the severity of product harm crises. The regression is 
estimated based on a subsample of medical device companies whose product recall severity 
information is manually collected from the website of the U.S. Food and Drug Administration. See 
Appendix A for variable definitions.
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                                                      Table 11 
Analysis of Earnings Components 
 
  Dependent Variable = CORE Dependent Variable = SPECIAL Dependent Variable = NonOP 
Variables Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic 
PCRISIS -0.002 (-0.499) -0.007*** (-3.517) 0.002** (2.083) 
LogMV 0.008*** (3.213) -0.004*** (-4.354) 0.001** (2.092) 
LEV 0.078*** (3.116) -0.001 (-0.118) -0.005 (-1.398) 
ROA 0.720*** (8.816) 0.211*** (4.471) -0.003 (-0.498) 
MTB 0.001* (1.763) 0.000 (0.524) -0.000 (-0.975) 
GROWTH 0.070*** (3.184) -0.009* (-1.719) 0.000 (0.159) 
IO 0.035* (1.893) -0.024*** (-3.242) -0.007* (-1.651) 
COVER -0.003 (-1.129) 0.001 (1.212) -0.000 (-0.870) 
PPE 0.018 (1.174) 0.002 (0.526) 0.002 (1.248) 
TMT 0.010** (2.252) -0.006*** (-2.595) -0.001 (-0.991) 
CEOSHARE 0.001*** (3.545) -0.000* (-1.862) -0.000 (-0.279) 
ZSCORE 0.004*** (3.301) -0.001* (-1.889) 0.000 (1.400) 
BIG4 -0.010** (-2.025) 0.005** (2.369) -0.001 (-0.438) 
RESTR 0.008** (2.089) -0.011*** (-3.988) -0.003*** (-3.057) 
WRITEOFF 0.006 (1.007) -0.011*** (-2.824) 0.001 (1.444) 
CONSTANT -0.054* (-1.667) 0.034*** (4.390) 0.007 (1.167) 
       
Industry Fixed Effect Yes  Yes  Yes  
Firm/Year Cluster Yes  Yes  Yes  
Observations 1,150  1,150  1,150  
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Adjusted R-squared 0.700   0.316   0.128   
 
*, **, *** indicate two-tailed statistical significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
This table presents the regression results on the relationship between product harm crises and earnings components. Earnings are broken down 
























Chapter 4 Do Banks Price the Product Failure? Evidence from Product Recalls 
 
 





















4.1 Introduction  
   A product failure can manifest in many ways. The product failure can be 
tracked back to design flaws, manufacturing or processing defects, software problems, 
packaging errors or inadequate labelling, improper storage, and handling and 
distribution of the product, or a combination of these (Marucheck, Greis, Mena, and 
Cai 2011). When product failure occurs, the firm can voluntarily decide to launch a 
product recall to remove the product from the market. The product recall is reported to 
be an increasingly prevalent phenomenon in the past two decades (CPSC 2010; Advisen 
Insurance Intelligence 2012; NHTSA 2015). Moreover, it is reported that firms will 
face an even higher risk of product recalls in the future (Chen, Ganesan, and Liu 2009
Chen and Nguyen 2013; Gao, Xie, and Wang 2015). 
       Regarding the financial consequences of product recalls, prior literature 
mostly focuses on stock market reaction to product recall announcements by the firms 
encountering product failures (hereafter recall firms) (Jarrell and Peltzman 1985; 
Hoffer, Stephan, and Robert 1988; Chen et al. 2009; Gao et al. 2015). The majority of 
these studies find that the recall firm’s stock price declines upon announcement of a 
product recall (Jarrell and Peltzman 1985; Dawar and Pillutla 2000; Hendricks and 
Singhal 2003; Siomkos and Shrivastava 1993). Surprisingly, no prior studies have 
investigated the debt market reaction to the announcement of a product recall.  I 
endeavor to provide, from the debtholders’ perspective, empirical evidence of the effect 
of a product recall. Specifically, I try to answer two questions:  
(1) Does experiencing a product recall affect the contracting term of a new bank loan? 
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(2) How does the changing of a new bank’s contracting term vary according to the 
recall firms’ characteristics? 
       The above questions are important for at least two reasons. First, it is well 
established that banks are one of the most important providers of external capital to a 
corporation (e.g., Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine 2001; Graham, Li, and Qiu 2008; Nini, 
Smith, and Sufi 2009; Armstrong, Guay, and Weber 2010). Given the significance of 
bank loans and the growing number of product recalls, it is important to investigate 
whether banks react to firms’ product recall announcements. Second, while most 
studies find that the equity market reacts negatively to the announcement of a product 
recall, several studies illustrate that the stock market over-reacts to the announcement 
of a product recall and hence rebounds later (Bromiley and Marcus 1989; Govindaraj 
and Jaggi 2004)44. In addition, Hoffer, Pruitt, and Reilly (1988) re-examine the same 
data and, after controlling for potential confounding events, find that those recall 
announcements do not significantly affect firm value. Thirumalai and Sinha (2011) do 
not find significant and negative stock market reaction to product recall announcements 
in the aggregate level in the medical device industry, where product recalls are 
considered a normal part of business. Debtholders are significantly different from 
equity holders. Debtholders have direct access to the proprietary information of the 
                                               
44 Bromiley and Marcus (1989) find that stock prices rebound 1 week after firms’ product harm crises, negating 
the negative effect of the product harm crisis (which is the most severe case of product recall). Govindaraj and 
Jaggi (2004) find that the market initially overreacts negatively to the recall news, and that this reaction is 
generally based on the near worst-case estimates of direct and indirect costs, litigation costs, regulation compliance 
costs, and costs associated with future losses in sales. The firms recovered their market value as more information 
on actual costs became available.  
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firms than the dispersed stockholders do (Bharath, Sunder, and Sunder 2008)45. Given 
banks’ direct access to private information and their superior information-processing 
abilities, investigating the banks’ reaction to product recalls can complement prior 
study examining the financial cost of a product recall.  
         There are several major supporting arguments that explain why banks are 
concerned about product recalls, which in turn lead to a significantly negative impact 
on firms’ loan contracting. Firstly, A direct argument is that a product recall incurs 
various direct costs to firms, which reduce earnings and cash flows and hence increases 
downside risk/default risk (Jarrell and Peltzman 1985). Secondly, a product recall has 
a negative impact on a firm’s reputation/brand value, as well as customers’ intention to 
purchase, which are found to influence the cost of debt (Himme and Fischer 2014; 
Anginer, Mansi, and Warburton 2015). Thirdly, a firm involved in a product recall has 
more private information, such that the information asymmetry problems are 
accentuated between the debtholders and the firm involved in product recall (Chen et 
al. 2009). Lastly, a product recall caused by a product failure may also reveal the CEO 
and management team’s bad risk-taking appetite, lack of caution, and lack of 
knowledge in operation and production management, which increase the firm’s 
operation risk (Marucheck et al. 2011; Ryu 2012;  Wowak et al. 2015B).  
                                               
45 Bank loans are based on direct negotiations between firms and their lenders, and priced by informed 
and sophisticated loan officers. Therefore, the loan market is more informationally efficient than the 




        To investigate the issue, I manually collected data on recall campaigns 
announced by public firms over the period from 2002 to 2013. Specifically, I manually 
collected data on product recalls from the US Consumer Product Safety Commission 
(CPSC) and food, drug, and medical device recalls from the US Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA). My final sample consists of 155 recall events spread over 31 
different two-digit SIC industries. From there, I searched the DealScan database to 
ascertain whether a firm had a reported loan in a 3-year period prior to the year of the 
announcement of the product recall or in the 3-year period subsequent to the year of the 
announcement of the product recall.  
          In my analysis, I begin by examining the effect of a product recall on the 
cost of a bank loan (hereafter interest spread) for a sample of firms announcing product 
recalls. Consistent with my prediction, I find that, in the aftermath of the announcement 
of a product recall, banks increase the average interest spread by 38 basis points, or an 
increase of around a million dollars in interest expense for each facility, which is 
economically significant. To mitigate the concerns of the confounding factors and 
macroeconomic changes of debt financing, I also use difference-in-difference research 
design by constructing a group of no-product-recall control firms using the propensity 
score matching (PSM) approach. The propensity score is a firm’s probability of 
incurring a product recall conditional on a vector of its observable characteristics. My 
difference-in-difference analysis yields qualitatively similar results. 
          Firms have different characteristics, so their risks during a product recall 
are perceived differently by banks. Specifically, I investigate debtholder reaction to 
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product recalls conditional on the information asymmetry concern and the firms’ ex-
ante ability to recover from a product recall. Firms announcing product recall 
experience more information asymmetry problems because of uncertainty regarding the 
impact of the product recalls on the firms’ future cash flow (Chao et al. 2009; Gokalp, 
Keskek, Kumas, and Subasi 2016). Firms with more independent directors can monitor 
information disclosure, which mitigates information asymmetry between debtholders 
and firms during and after the product recalls. The firms’ ability to recover from product 
recalls depends on whether they have ex-ante sale contracting or long-term supplier 
contracts (Bernard 2016). Firms with more ability to recover from product recall would 
be considered as having a lower risk of default by bankers. My result provides 
supporting evidence that firms announcing product recalls with the independent board 
of director and greater ex-ante ability to recover from product recalls experience lower 
increases in interest spreads after the announcement of a product recall.  
          Next, I also provide additional tests to extend my findings. I find that a 
firm’s product recall also impacts non-pricing bank loan contracts. Specifically, based 
on the matched sample, I find that a loan contracted after the event of a product recall 
has a shorter bank loan maturity and a higher number of debt covenants. The non-price 
terms represent additional costs borne by recall firms. Furthermore, Bromiley and 
Marcus (1989) argue that, at a fundamental level, the market anticipates a normal 
number of product recalls per firm per period. In line with this, I also investigate 
whether my finding is mainly driven by firms announcing multiple product recalls over 
the sample-period years. My result shows that the negative relation between interest 
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spread and the announcement of a product recall exists for the sample of firms 
announcing product recalls only once during the sample period. However, debtholders 
more severely penalize recall firms announcing multiple product recalls over the years 
by charging a higher interest spread. Lastly, like the Thirumali et al. (2013) study, 
which doesn’t find negative and significant stock reaction to product recalls in 
aggregate in the medical industry, I also find that debtholders do not react significantly 
to these firms in aggregate.  
          The contributions of this study are threefold. First, while prior literature 
examined the impact of a product recall on a firm’s financing cost from an equity 
holders’ perspective (Jarrell and Peltzman 1985; Hoffer et al. 1988; Hendricks and 
Singhal 2003; Chen et al. 2009; Gao et al. 2015), my study is the first to investigate this 
growing phenomenon from the debt market reaction. Findings in this study add to the 
knowledge of the nature and degree of association between financing costs and product 
recalls from the perspective of an important stakeholder—the bank.  
Second, this study illustrates an important channel through which the product recall 
causes firms’ losses. While prior studies find a negative security price reaction to a 
firm’s product harm crisis announcement, my findings help explain the decline in stock 
price. Van Heerde et al. (2007) indicate that security price is an aggregate indicator that 
does not identify the underlying mechanisms through which the resulting value loss 
merges. Therefore, Van Heerde et al. (2007) investigate whether it is entirely due to a 
loss in baseline sales or whether it can be attributed to the spillover effect to other 
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products under the same label. In a similar spirit, this study identifies a new mechanism 
of loss, which is the adverse bank loan reaction to the product harm crisis.  
         Third, this study complements the literature on bank loan contracting. While 
prior studies find that bank loans can be affected by other specific firm-level events 
such as firms’ restatements (Graham et al. 2008), weaknesses in internal control over 
financial reporting (Costello and Wittenberg-Moerman 2011; Kim, Song, and Zhang 
2011), auditor turnover and auditor reports (Chen, He, Ma, and Stice 2016; Francis, 
Hunter, Robinson, Robinson, and Ma 2017), shareholder lawsuits (Deng, Willis, and 
Xu 2014; Yuan and Zhang 2015), and customer firms’ bankruptcies (Houston, Jiang, 
and Lin 2015), this study identifies an event in relation to firms’ product failures, which 
can impact bank loan contracting. Furthermore, by distinguishing the circumstances in 
which firms’ product recalls can impact firms’ bank loan contracting terms, this study 
illustrates that, while recall is growing prevalently and rapidly, its impact on firms’ 
bank loan contracting is not uniform.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses prior literature and 
develops the hypothesis. Section 3 discusses sample selection. Section 4 discusses 
research design and results. Additional tests are provided in Section 5, and Section 6 
concludes the paper.  
 
4.2 Hypothesis Development (Figure 1) 
4.2.1 Product Recalls and Bank Loans 
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        Banks, as debtholders or creditors, own fixed claims that are more senior than 
the residual and limited liability claims of shareholders. Nevertheless, their payoff 
structure has a limited upside potential that mainly exposes them to downside risks. In 
other words, when firms perform very well, banks’ payoffs are capped by the sum of 
the interest and the initial amount of money borrowed by firms. However, when firms 
perform poorly, banks risk losing all the money borrowed by the firms. Given the 
asymmetric payoff, I posit that there are three reasons why the product harm crisis can 
have a negative impact on firms’ loan contracting.  
         First, a firm incurs various costs when experiencing product recalls, which 
likely leads to lower future revenues. Jarrell and Peltzman (1985) and Hendricks and 
Singhal (2003) indicate various costs that a firm must bear during a product recall, 
including the costs of correcting/replacing the defective product, the transaction costs 
of the recall process, the costs of unsold inventory, the costs of potential litigation, and 
the costs of changes in practices to improve quality. These costs have a direct negative 
impact on current and future cash flow, which in turn increases the firm’s downside 
risk/default risk.  
         Second, recent studies find that a firm’s reputation/brand values and 
customer satisfaction help explain the variation in the cost of debt. The better the firm’s 
reputation/brand value and customer’s satisfaction, the lower the cost of debt (Himme 
et al. 2014; Anginer 2015). Consumer confidence toward firm’s ability to manufacture 
reliable and high-quality products becomes lower due to the product recalls; thus, the 
firm’s brand equity/reputation are impaired by its product recall (Siomkos and 
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Shrivastava 1993; Dawar and Pillutla 2000; Van Heerde, Helsen, & Dekimpe 2007; 
Rubel, Prasad, and Shuba 201; Cleeren et al. 2013).  
           Third, the information asymmetry is accentuated in the event of a product 
recall (Chen et al. 2009). Specifically, a recall firm involved a product recall possesses 
more private information about the severity of the product recall and its implications 
on the firm’s future cash flow and revenue. Prior studies find that debtholders are more 
suspicious about accounting information provided by firms going through misconducts, 
and then charge higher interest spreads to these firms to compensate for higher 
information asymmetry (Graham et al. 2008; Yuan and Zhang 2016). As a result, 
debtholders also charge higher interest spreads to recall firms to compensate for higher 
information asymmetry.  
           Lastly, recent studies find that CEO risk-taking preference and 
carelessness can cause lack of interest or caution in investing in the maintenance and 
improvement of product reliability (Wowak et al. 2015A). Further, a CEO’s lack of 
experience in production and supply chain management procedures can also result in 
product quality failure, which leads to product failure (Marucheck, Greis, Mena, and 
Cai 2011; Ryu 2012; Wowak et al. 2015B). As product recall may reveal the operational 
and supply chain management problems of the firm, and the lack of caution and 
experience of the top management team, debtholders may price a higher interest spread 
to compensate for higher credit risk caused by operational risk. 
         However, there are several counter-arguments that creditors may not be 
particularly concerned about the product recall. First, product recall becomes common 
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and costly to avoid due to the increasing globalization of production, increasing 
complexity of products, more stringent product-safety laws, and increasing monitoring 
by both firms and government agencies (Berman 1999; Chen et al. 2009). As a result, 
there is no certainty that debtholders will react to this frequent event. For example, 
Hoffer, Pruitt, and Reilly (1988) find that recall announcements do not significantly 
affect firm value. Kalaignanam, Kushwaha, and Eilert (2013) and Haunschild and Rhee 
(2004), for example, found that firms can learn from recalls and thus can modify their 
operations, which may lead to fewer product recalls in the future. If creditors perceive 
product recall as part of normal business, they may not react to the product recall 
announcement in aggregate. Second, based on experimental study, Vassilikopoulou et 
al. (2009) find that the negative effects of a firm’s product recall on customers’ 
perceptions diminish quickly after the event has occurred, because consumers tend to 
forget about the product recall event 3 months later. Anecdotal evidence also seems to 
confirm this point. Cook, formerly an executive at Ford Motor Co (F.N) for 10 years, 
said in an interview “You have to be proactive and I think they’ll be forgiving if it’s 
not really, really serious. People have short memories about that stuff.” If debtholders 
also believe that product recalls, in general, have a short-lived impact on the firm’s 
reputation and customers’ purchase intention, they are unlikely to become particularly 
concerned about the event. Third, firms often proactively take various measures and 
strategies preceding and following the announcement of product recall to rescue their 
reputation and to minimize the negative impact of product recalls (Chen et al. 2009; 
Cleeren et al. 2013; Gao et al. 2015). Using case studies, some research finds that a 
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product recall announcement is sometimes interpreted by the stock market as indicative 
of the fulfilment of corporate social responsibility (CSR), and therefore has a positive 
impact on firm value in terms of reputational improvement, as these firms act very 
responsibly by removing the products promptly from market and compensating for the 
customers’losses (Minor & Morgan 2011). Therefore, there is no certainty that 
debtholders increase interest spread in response to firms’ product recall in aggregate. 
Thus, it remains an empirical question whether banks negatively react to firms’ product 
recalls. Accordingly, I form the hypothesis in the null form: 
 
Hypothesis 1: The product recall announcement does not influence the cost of the bank 
loan (interest spread). 
 
4.2.2 Product Recall Effect and Board of Directors Independence  
       The bank’s negative reaction to a firm’s product recall announcement can be 
attributed to information asymmetry caused by the firm’s product recall. The 
information asymmetry problem between bank and firm becomes more serious after 
the product recall than before because there is high uncertainty regarding the negative 
impact of a product recall on the firm’s current and future financial performance (Chao 
et al. 2009). Managers possess more private information about the severity of the 
product recall, such as the root causes of the defect, the number of units to be recalled, 
the cost of replacing or repairing the defective product, and so on (Chao et al. 2009; 
Gokalp, Keskek, Kumas, and Subasi 2016). Managers with private information 
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regarding a product recall can manipulate financial reporting information to minimize 
the investors’ negative perception of the real impact of a product recall on the firm’s 
financial performance (Jiang, Magnan, Su, and Zhang 2017). Meanwhile, lenders also 
become very suspicious of the financial information provided by firms during 
misconduct or events that cause negative publicity(Yuan and Zhang 2015). Duffie and 
Lando (2001) develop a theory that information risk is incremental to a firm’s default 
risk. Empirical studies also consistently find that higher information asymmetry 
between banks and firms causes banks to price higher interest spread to compensate for 
additional risks caused by information asymmetry (Graham et al. 2008; Kim et al. 2011; 
etc.). For example, Hasan et al. (2012) find that earnings predictability is an important 
factor in bank loan contracting terms, and firms with more predictable earnings have 
more favourable loan terms. The independent board of directors’ main responsibility 
consists of monitoring for fraudulent financial disclosures and disciplining managers’ 
fraudulent behaviour (Kanagaretnam, Lobo, and Whalen 2007), and thus lessen the 
information symmetry problem after the announcement of a product recall. Therefore, 
I posit the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 2: The relationship between product recalls and cost of debt (interest 
spread) is moderated by independent board of directors.  
 




         The banker’s negative reaction to a firm’s product recall can also be 
attributed to the bank’s perception of the impact of the product recall on the firm’s 
financial health or credit risk. I use the firm’s ex-ante sale contracting, or long-term 
supply contracting, to measure the firm’s ex-ante ability to recover from a product recall. 
When firms experience product recalls, they are faced with the risk of losing their 
existing customers because of the customers’ loss of confidence (Dawar and Pillutla 
2000). Further, using price wars and other strategies, competitor firms can engage in 
predation to accelerate the loss of clients to drive firms involved in product recall out 
of business (Bernard 2016). Furthermore, the direct cost and indirect cost associated 
with product recall can cause a large amount of cash payout. The long-term supply 
contract can be very effective in mitigating the risk of losing customers, because it is 
unlikely that the customer will break a long-term contract (Bernard 2016). It is also 
more difficult for a competitor to engage in predation because the long-term contract 
makes it longer and more costly for a competitor to predate the market share (Bernard 
2016). Lastly, a long-term contract gives firms involved in product recall more time to 
raise capital.  
 
Hypothesis 3: The relationship between product recall and cost of debt (interest spread) 
is less negative for firms with long-term supply contracts.  
 
4.3 Sample Selection  
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        I collect data on product recall campaigns following prior studies (Kini et al. 
2016). Specifically, I collect data on product recall campaigns announced during the 
period from January 2002 to December 2012 using two US regulatory agencies that 
govern product quality and safety: FDA and CPSC. I collect information on food, drug, 
and medical device recalls from the weekly enforcement report published by FDA, and 
I collect information on consumer recalls from CPSC. CPSC covers a diverse range of 
industries, such as children’s products, household appliances, heating and cooling 
equipment, home furnishings, toys, nursery products, workshop hardware and tools, 
and yard equipment, among others. For firms with multiple recalls in the sample period, 
I retain only the first record. Since I require firms to have loans initiated 3 years before 
and after product recall announcement, my loan sample covers firms with bank loans 
that originated between 1998 and 2015 according to the Loan Pricing Corporation’s 
(LPC) DealScan database. The DealScan database contains both the price and non-price 
terms of loans. I retrieve annual financial data from Compustat and corporate 
governance data from Institutional Shareholder Service (BoardEx). I match firms in the 
DealScan database with those in the Compustat database using the link table provided 
by Chava and Roberts (2008). These selection criteria result in a final sample of crisis 
firms. These selection criteria result in a final sample containing 181 crisis firms, as 
reported in Table 1. To eliminate the effects of extreme observations, I winsorize all 
continuous variables at the 1% level in both tails. I also present the industry break-up 
of my sample of recalls based on two-digit SIC codes sorted by the frequency of firms 
that appearing in the sample. Instrument and Related Products had the most crisis firms 
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(25%), followed by Chemical and Allied Products (12%), and Food and Kindred 
Products (5%). These sub-sample results are reported in Table 2. 
 
4.4 Research Design and Empirical Results  
4.4.1 Regression Model 
         To investigate the effect of the announcement of the product recalls on 
changes in the interest spread for recall firms around the announcement dates of the 
product recall, I follow Graham et al. (2008) and Kim et al. (2011) by controlling for 
firm-specific, loan-specific, and macroeconomic factors in my regression model. The 
pre-crisis period is defined as the 3 years preceding the announcement date of product 
recall and the post-crisis period as the 3 years following the announcement date of the 
product recall. The sample contains all recall firms that issued a bank loan both before 
and after the product recalls. 
The main empirical model is as follows: 
Interest Spread = Post + Size + Leverage + MTB + Profitability + Tangibility + 
Altman Z Score + Cash Flow Volatility + Credit Spread + Term Spread + Perform 
Pricing + Log loan Maturity + Log Loan Amount + Loan Type + Loan Purpose + 
Industry Dummy + ε             Equation (1) 
         A loan package may comprise several facilities/loans, and each facility can 
have different loan terms. As the basic unit of empirical research is a loan, my 
regression model is conducted at the facility level, as in prior studies (e.g., Graham et 
al. 2008). Because the same firm can have multiple observations, I address potential 
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within and between firm residual correlation by clustering standard errors at both the 
firm and year levels, as suggested by Petersen (2009) and Gow et al. (2010). I also 
winsorize all continuous variables at the 1% level in both tails.  
          The dependent variable of interest, Interest Spread, is the drawn all-in 
spread. I follow Graham et al. (2008) and Kim et al. (2011) and measure the all-in 
drawn spread as the amount the borrower pays in basis points over the London 
Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) or a LIBOR equivalent for each dollar drawn down. 
This measure adds the borrowing spread of the loan over LIBOR to any annual fee paid 
to the bank group. To capture the effect of the product recalls, I define a dummy 
variable, Post, that is set equal to one if the loan initiation is after the announcement 
date of product recall, and zero otherwise. If banks perceive product recall as a signal 
of higher default risk, then the coefficient of Post is expected to be significantly positive.  
To control for firm-specific variables affecting interest spread, I include firm size, 
leverage, growth opportunity, profitability, tangibility, Z score, and the cash flow 
volatility. Firm size (Size) is measured by the natural logarithm of total assets. As larger 
firms are more diversified, mature, and have good reputations, meaning that they have 
a lower default risk (Bae and Goyal 2009), I expect that larger firms have lower interest 
spreads. The leverage ratio (Leverage) is the sum of long-term debt plus current 
liabilities to total assets. Firms with higher leverage borrow more, so they have higher 
default risk. Therefore, I expect leverage to be positively associated with interest spread. 
Growth opportunities (MTB) are the market value of equity scaled by the book value of 
equity at year end. On the one hand, a firm with growth potential may be subject to an 
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information asymmetry problem and vulnerable to financial distress. On the other hand, 
growth opportunities are positively associated with credit quality (Graham et al. 2008). 
Thus, I do not have a clear prediction regarding MTB. Profitability (Profitability) refers 
to earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA). As 
profitable firm have lower credit risk, I expect them to have a lower cost of debt. Asset 
tangibility (Tangibility) is the ratio of net property, plant, and equipment over total 
assets. Debtholders can relatively easily liquidate a firm’s tangible asset should the firm 
default, so the debtholders’ loss is mitigated. Thus, I expect more tangible assets should 
have lower interest spread. I construct a modified Altman Z-score to control for firm 
default risk. A higher Z-score indicates a lower insolvency risk, so I expect it to be 
negatively associated with interest spread. Finally, cash flow volatility (Cash flow 
volatility) represents the standard deviation of quarterly operating cash flow over the 
16 fiscal quarters before the loan initiation. Higher cash flow volatility implies higher 
risk to make a debt payment, so I expect cash flow volatility to be positively associated 
with a cost of debt. All firm-specific variables are measured as of the year prior to the 
loan initiation date. 
          I also control for loan-specific characteristics that prior literature following 
prior studies (Graham et al. 2008; Lin et al. 2011). I first include performance pricing 
(Perform pricing), an indicator variable equal to one if a loan facility uses a performance 
pricing clause, and zero otherwise. Performance pricing directly links the cost of debt 
to firms’ accounting performance, which makes an incomplete contract more complete. 
This ex-ante repricing mechanism could affect the cost of debt (Asquith et al. 2005; 
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Armstrong et al. 2010). I also control for Maturity, which is the natural log of the loan’s 
maturity in months. My model also includes the loan amount (Log loan amount). I 
expect the amount to be negatively associated with the cost of debt because of the 
economies of scale. Finally, I also control for loan contract attribute by including loan 
type (e.g., term loan, revolving loan) and loan purpose (e.g., debt repayment, working 
capital needs) indicator variables. Prior studies show that different loan types and loan 
purposes can affect loan prices (Graham et al. 2008). 
         To control for macroeconomic conditions, my model includes the 
macroeconomic variables Term spread and Credit spread. The variable Credit spread is 
the yield difference between BAA and AAA corporate bonds, which increases during 
economic recessions and decreases during economic expansions. Term spread is 
measured as the difference between 1- and 2-year Treasury bonds, increases (decreases) 
in good (bad) economic prospects. The debtholder requires a higher cost of debt from 
firms to compensate for default risk from the economic environment (Collin-Dufresne 
et al. 2001; Lin et al. 2011).  
         Table 3 presents descriptive statistics of the crisis firm. Recall firms have a 
mean leverage ratio of 0.248, a market-to-book ratio of 2.247, and profitability of 0.158. 
The average interest spread is about 164.654 basis points, and the average loan size is 
US $19.261 million. 
          Table 4 display the interest spread (in basis points) 3 years before and after 
the announcement of a product recall. The pre-announcement average interest spread 
is 149.44, and the post-announcement average interest spread is 186.77. Thus, there is 
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an increase of interest spread after the product recall. The difference between pre-
announcement and post-announcement is 37.32, which is statistically significant.  
 
4.4.2 Product Recall and Interest Spread: Test of H1 
        Table 5 reports the results of my main regression in equation (1), using 
Interest Spread as the dependent variable. I regress Interest Spread on the test variable 
Post, with the full set of control variables discussed. All reported t-values are computed 
based on standard errors, which are double clustered at the firm and year level (Petersen 
2009; Gow et al. 2010). As the results in Column 1 of Table 5 show, the coefficient on 
Post (49.16) is significantly positive at the 1% level, consistent with the prediction of 
H1. The coefficient on Post indicates that, all else being equal, the interest spread 
increases by 38 bps after the product recall for recall firms. This result supports the 
prediction that banks penalize firms’ product recall events46. It is worth noting that the 
product recall event captures the increase in risk beyond any risk factors captured by 
the other independent variables, such as profitability, market-to-book ratio, and 
Altman’s Z-score. Finding a significant coefficient crisis firm indicates that the other 
variables cannot fully capture the incremental risk due to product recall, which provides 
supportive evidence for my conjecture. 
         Turning to control variables, I find that interest spread is positively 
associated with firms’ leverage, credit spread, and term spread. Also, interest spread is 
negatively associated with firms’ size, tangibility, profitability, and loan performance 
                                               
46 I also use the natural log of interest spread. The sign and significance doesn’t change.  
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pricing. All the results of the control variables also provide evidence that is essentially 
consistent with prior studies. 
 
4.4.3 Product Recall and Board of Director Independence: Test of H2s 
         To examine the impact of corporate governance independence on the 
relationship between the product recall event and the cost of bank debt, I introduce a 
continuous variable, Independent Board of Directors, to equation (1). Independent 
Board of Director is measured as the number of independent directors divided by the 
total number of directors sitting on the firm’s board. The sample size drops dramatically 
because of the missing value to measure the independence of the board of directors.  
The results are presented in Table 6. I find that the coefficients of Post*Independent 
Board of Director are significant and negative, which suggests that a recall firm with 
an independent board of directors experiences a smaller increase in interest spreads 
after a product recall event. The coefficient on Post*Independent Board of Director 
indicates that, all else being equal, the recall firms with the more independent board of 
directors experience an 80.39 bps smaller increase in interest spread after the product 
recall compared to recall firms with the less independent board of directors. 
 
4.4.4 Product Recall and Firm’s Ex-Ante Ability to Recover from Product Recall: 
Test of H3 
          To examine the impact of an ex-ante contract on the relationship between 
product recall event and the cost of a bank loan, I measure the ex-ante contract by 
123 
 
following prior studies (Rauch 1999; Costello 2013). Basically, if firms work in the 
manufacturing industry and produce “differentiated products,” then it is more likely 
they have longer-term supplier contracts. The rational is as follows: Prior studies find 
that the manufacturer firms account for the majority of the long-term supplier contracts 
in their sample (Costello 2013). Firms that produce products that are not homogenous 
but are differentiated are more likely to maintain the long-term supplier relation with 
their customers, as it is more difficult for customers to replace current suppliers (Rauch 
1999). Thus, I code Ex-Ante Contract as one if the firm is a manufacturer (NAICS codes 
31–33) that produces differentiated products based on the classification scheme of 
Rauch (1999). As shown in Table 7, I find that the coefficients of Post*Ex Ante 
Contract (-57) are significant and negative, which suggests that recall firms with ex-
ante contracts will experience a smaller increase in interest spreads after product recall 
events. Overall, the result supports the prediction of hypothesis 2 that debtholders’ 
reaction to the announcement of a product recall becomes less negative if the firm’s ex-
ante characteristics imply that it will be easier for the firm to recover from product 
recalls.  
 
4.5 Robustness Tests 
4.5.1 Difference-in-Difference Analysis Based on a Propensity Score-Matched 
Sample 
        My findings would be biased if certain firm characteristics caused product 
recall and higher cost of debt. Thus, my result could be driven by these firm 
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characteristics, even without product recall announcement. Further, my result could be 
biased if it merely captures an upward trend of increasing cost of debt financing for all 
firms over the years. To mitigate these concerns, I use the Propensity Scoring Matching 
method to construct a control sample. In the first step, I run a probit model of the 
probability of encountering product recall for all firms to compute the propensity score. 
I then match each recall firm with the control firm that has the closet propensity score 
of announcing a product recall, but without announcing it before initiating a new loan. 
I also require that the control sample firms have bank loan data both before and after 
the corresponding year of the product recall announcement of the matched recall firms. 
The matching procedure is detailed in Appendix C.  
          I perform multivariate analysis on the matched sample by controlling for 
firm characteristics, loan characteristics, and macroeconomic conditions as defined in 
equation 1. I label all recall firms as Recall, an indicator variable, then I include an 
interaction variable Recall*Post into equation (1). The regression model is as follow: 
 
Interest Spread = Post + Recall Firm + Post*Recall Firm + Size + Leverage + 
MTB + Profitability + Tangibility + Altman + Cash Flow Volatility + Credit 
spread + Term spread + Perform pricing + Log loan maturity + Log loan amount + 





       I expect that the coefficient of  Post*Recall Firm to be positive. This is 
because of this coefficient capturing whether the magnitude of increase in the cost of 
debt differs between recall firms and control firms after the announcement date of the 
product recall. So, a positive coefficient shows that the announcement of the product 
recall increases the recall firm’s cost of debt.  
       The regression results are shown in Table 8. The coefficient of Post*Recall 
Firm (39.25) is positive and significant. It indicates that the interest spread increases by 
39.25 bps after the announcement of the product recall for recall firms relative to 
control firms. In sum, the result provides evidence that indicates that recall firms 
experience significantly higher increases in the cost of debt after the announcement of 
the product recall.  
 
4.5.2 Effect of Product Recall on the Non-Price Terms of Bank Loans 
         In addition to interest spread, bank loans also include the various non-price 
terms. I also expect that product recall can influence the major non-price terms of a 
bank loan, such as covenant intensity, loan maturity, and collateral requirement. 
Regarding covenant intensity, prior studies find that debt covenant serves as a 
monitoring device for firms’ default risks (Dichev and Skinner 2002). Further, 
contingent control transfer from covenant can preempt the borrower’s suboptimal 
action (Rajan and Winton 1995; Park 2000; Christensen and Nikolaev 2012). Since 
product recall create uncertainty regarding the firm’s credit risk, I expect that the bank 
may impose more covenant on a firm after a product recall is announced. 
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       Short-term debt allows the lender to take control more quickly, so debtholder 
can give short-term debt to firms with high information asymmetry and poor financial 
conditions (Diamond 1991). On top of that, Barclay and Smith (1995) find that firms 
with larger information asymmetries issue more short-term debt. Since product recalls 
create information asymmetry and make lenders suspicious of the firms’ financial 
reporting credibility, I expect that lenders provide loans with shorter maturity to firms 
announcing product recalls to mitigate concerns about information asymmetry. 
Collateral is another essential non-price term of bank loans that allows the lender to 
mitigate concerns about information asymmetry and to recover the financial loss in the 
event of default (Ranjan and Winton 1995). Prior studies show that debtholders require 
collateral for borrowers with opaque information (e.g., Berger and Udell 1990; Jimenez 
et al. 2006) and high default risk (Jimenez and Saurina 2004). I therefore expect that 
banks are more likely to require recall firms to pledge collateral on the loan after the 
announcement of product recall. 
         To assess the impact of the product recall on the non-price term of bank 
loans, I estimate equation (1) with non-price term as the dependent variable. Non-price 
terms include Number of covenants, Loan maturity, and Collateral. I test each non-
price term separately and retain the same list of control variables as in equation (1), 
which includes loan- and firm-specific characteristics and economy-wide factors. I 
exclude the variable Loan Maturity from the control variables list when the dependent 
variable is Loan Maturity. The variable number of covenants is measured by the total 
number of general and financial covenants of a loan. Loan maturity is loan terms 
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measured in months, and Collateral is a dummy variable taking the value of one if the 
loan is secured by collateral, and zero otherwise. The robust standard errors are 
clustered at both the firm and year levels, as suggested by Petersen (2009) and Gow et 
al. (2010), except for the Poisson regression for Number of covenants, whose standard 
errors are clustered by firm.  
        The results in Table 9 show that, for the dependent variable Loan maturity, 
the coefficient of Post is negative and significant, so it indicates that banks reduce the 
loan term after the recall firms’ announcement of the product recall. For the dependent 
variable Number of covenants, I also find that the coefficient of Post is significant and 
positive. It suggests that banks increase the number of the covenant after the recall firms’ 
announcement of product recall. Taken together, it shows that banks also use the non-
price terms to react to firms’ announcements of product recall. 
 
4.5.3 Product Recall Frequency Effect and Interest Spread  
          Some prior studies find that when firms encountering product recall very 
rarely, the announcement of product recalls are not perceived negatively by the 
stakeholders. Based on the automobile industry, Bromiley and Marcus (1989) suggest 
that, at a fundamental level, the market anticipates a normal number of product recalls 
per firm per period. Anecdotal evidence also demonstrates that a firm may not get 
punished by the market when the firm only rarely announces product recalls. For 
example, in 1998, BSX recalled one of their stent products. Rather than punishing the 
firm, the market reacted positively—BSX enjoyed a 5.54% positive abnormal return in 
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its stock price in the period immediately following the announcement. BSX had a good 
reputation for product safety, so the rare product recall is considered as fulfillment of 
good social responsibility. However, the next year, when BSX announce a new product 
recall, the stock market reacted very negatively to the announcement. In addition, 
Kalaignanam et al. (2013) argue and find that firms could gain experience and 
knowledge from prior product recalls to improve product reliability in the future. Thus, 
it is possible that my result in the equation 1 is driven by the firm that announces 
multiple product recalls over several years during the post period. To test the impact of 
product recall frequency on the cost of a bank loan, I first test the impact of product 
recall announcements on the interest spread for those firms that encounter product recall 
only in 1 year in the post period. I introduce a variable named Single Recall, which 
represents the post period for firms encountering product recall only in 1 year. Second, 
I also examine the impact of the total number of years in which there were occurrences 
of product recalls on the interest spread by introducing a variable named Multiple 
Recalls. It is measured as the number of years in which there were occurrences of 
product recalls. Table 10 shows that the coefficient on the variable Single Recall is 
positive and significant (51.23), meaning that banks charge higher interest spreads to 
firms with product recalls in only 1 year. Thus, it shows that the result from model (1) 
is not driven by firms having several recalls in multiple years. Next, the coefficient on 
the variable Multiple Recalls is also positive and significant (25.41). It indicates that 
debtholders charge higher interest spreads as the number of years in which there are 
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product recalls increases. Taken together, it shows that my result in model 1 is not 
driven by recalls firms with multiple product recalls in several years.  
 
4.5.4 Product Recall Effect and Industry Effect 
        Thirumalai and Sinha (2011) find that, unlike the stock market reaction to 
product recall announcements in the food industry (Thomsen and McKenzie 2001) and 
automotive industry (Jarrell and Peltzman 1985; Bromiley and Marcus 1989), the stock 
market reaction to product recalls in the medical device industry is not significant. They 
attribute this insignificance of market reaction to three major factors: the high frequency 
and volume of recalls, strict regulation, and purchase relationships in the medical 
industry. For example, firms in the medical device industry face very stringent 
monitoring and regulation from FDA. Medical devices that get approved by FDA signal 
their firms’ ability to fabricate high-quality devices. This stringent regulation and 
monitoring by FDA mitigates firms’ liability concerns when faced with product recalls. 
Similarly, the negative impact of a product recall on firms’ bank loan contracting may 
depend on industries. If bankers hold the same perception as the shareholders, they are 
likely to not react negatively to product harm crises in the medical device industry. 
However, given that banks are more risk averse because they do not have the upside 
gain, it is possible that banks react negatively to the announcement of a product recall. 
I select the recall firms operating in the medical industry and then I examine the impact 
of the product recall on the interest spread. As shown in Table 11, I find that debtholders 
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do not charge higher interest spreads to the announcement of the product recall in the 
medical industry. This is similar to the findings of Thirumalai and Sinha (2011). 
 
4.6 Conclusion 
      This study investigates whether banks react to firms’ announcements of product 
recalls. I find that banks charge higher interest spread and other non-price terms to firms 
in the period of 3 years following firms’ product recalls. In order to mitigate 
endogenous problem, I also use strict criteria to construct my propensity scoring 
matching sample, and still find that banks react to firms’ product recall. I also conduct 
a series of tests to examine the degree of impact of product recalls across firms. Overall, 
the results strongly support that banks react negatively to firms’ product recalls. 
        This study has an important caveat. The study argues and finds that the 
independence of the board of directors can mitigate the negative impact of product 
recalls on banks’ reactions. However, it is possible that other dimensions and measures 
of effectiveness of the board of directors, such as the industry expertise of the board of 
directors or the existence of risk committee, play more important roles during and after 
the announcement of product recalls. Since the measures can be manually collected, 
future research can be conducted to shed more light on the effectiveness of the board 
of directors in mitigating the damages of product recalls. Lastly, prior studies have 
found that disclosed ICFR weakness is associated with a higher cost of debt. Similar to 
the launch of product recalls, disclosing ICFR also send the signal of a poor internal 
control over business process and an operational management failure, future study 
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could examine whether banks react more strongly to firms which announce product 
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Appendix A Variable Definitions 
 
Variable names Variable definitions 
  
Product recall variables  
Post 
A dummy variable that equal one if the date of 
loan initiation is after the announcement of 
product recall, zero otherwise. 
Multiple recalls A dummy variable that equal one if firm is 
involved in product recall, and zero otherwise. 
Number of prior recalls 
A continuous variable counting the total number 
of years in which there is a product recall 
Firm characteristics  
Leverage 
(Long-term debt + debt in current 
liabilities)/total assets. 
Size Natural log of total assets at year-end. 
Market-to-book (Market value of equity plus book value of 
liabilities and preferred stock)/Total Assets 
Profitability EBITDA/total assets 
Tangibility Net property, plant and equipment/total assets. 
Altman 
calculated as (1.2 * working capital +1.4 * 
retained earnings +  3.3 * EBIT + 1.0 * 
sales)/total assets. 
Cash Flow Volatility 
Standard deviation of quarterly cash flows from  
operations over the fiscal years before the loan 
initiation year scaled by total debt. 
Independent Board of Director  
is measure as the number of independent 
directors divided by the total number of directors 
sitting on firm’s board 
Loan characteristics  
Interest Spread 
Interest spread is measured as all-in spread 
drawn in the Dealscan database. All-in spread 
drawn is defined as the amount the borrower 
pays in basis points over LIBOR or LIBOR 
equivalent for each dollar drawn down. (For 
loans not based on LIBOR, LPC converts the 
spread into LIBOR terms by adding or 
subtracting a differential which is adjusted 
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periodically.) This measure adds the borrowing 
spread of the loan over LIBOR with any annual 
fee paid to the bank group. 
Loan Maturity Natural log of the loan term. Loan term is 
measured in months. 
Security Dummy A dummy variable that equals one if a collateral 
is pledged on a facility, and zero otherwise. 
Loan Amount 
Natural log of the loan facility amount. Loan 
amount is measured in millions of dollars. 
Performance pricing dummy 
A dummy variable that equals 1 if the loan 
facility uses performance pricing, and 0 
otherwise. 
Number of covenants A total number of financial and general 
covenants of a loan facility. 
Loan type dummies 
A dummy variable for loan type, including term 
loans, revolvers greater than one year, revolvers 
less than 1 year, and 364-day facilities. 
Loan purpose 
dummies 
A dummy variable for loan purposes, including 
corporate purposes, debt repayment, working 
capital, and takeovers. 
Macroeconomic factors  
Credit spread 
The difference between BAA and AAA 
corporate bond yields (data source: Federal 
Reserve Board of Governors). 
Term spread 
The difference between the 10-year Treasury 
yield and the 2-year Treasury yield (data source: 
















Propensity scoring matching method 
 
Certain firms’ characteristics are associated with the propensity of encountering 
product recall such as financial leverage, Zscore, size, and R&D (Kini et al., 2016). 
Therefore, I first use these firm’s characteristics to estimate a probit model that 
computes the probability of encountering product recall, using all available 
information between the period 1996 to 2015. My probit regression model is as 
follows:  
Prob (product recall = 1) = Size + Leverage + Zscore + R&D+ Industry + ε  
Where product recall is an indicator variable taking the value of 1 if there is the 
announcement of product recall during a fiscal year, and 0 otherwise.   
Second, I use the obtained coefficients to compute the propensity score for each firm 
in each year. Then I merge the propensity score with all sample firms which have the 
necessary information for bank loan and other control variables. For each recall firm 
that have bank loan information not only in the three years preceding the 
announcement of product recall but also in the three years following the 
announcement of product recall, I require the control firm is : 1) from the same 
industry based on two-digit SIC code, 2) the control firm have bank loan information 
not only in the three years preceding the announcement of product recall but also in 
the three years following the announcement of product recall, 3) the absolute 
difference in propensity score between recall firms and control firms in the year prior 
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to the announcement of product recall is the smallest,  4) a firm can be only used 


































































































Recall-Starting Year No. of Recall Firms 
2003 25  
2004 27  
2005 15  
2006 17  
2007 16  
2008 7  
2009 9  
2010 4  
2011 7  















Two-digit SIC Description of industry Percent 
13 Oil and Gas  0.73 
20 Food and Kindred Products 5.19 
22 Textile Mills Product  0.42 
23 Apparel & Other Textile Product 2.18 
24 Lumber & Wood Products 0.42 
25 Furniture & Fixtures 2.49 
26 Paper & Allied Products 2.49 
28 Chemical & Allied Products 12.36 
30 Rubber & Miscellaneous Plastics 
Products 
1.14 
31 Leather & Leather Prdocuts  0.42 
32 Stone, Clay, & Glass Products 0.52 
34 Fabricated Metal Products 1.04 
35 Industrial Machinery & Equipment 2.8 
36 Electronic & Other Electric Equipment 5.4 
38 Instruments & Related Products 25.13 
39 Micellaneous Manufacturing Industries 5.5 
50 Wholesale Trade - Durable Goods 1.87 
51 wholesale Trade - Nondurable Goods 4.88 
52 
Building Materials & Gardening 
Supplies 1.66 
53 General Merchandize Stores 4.67 
54 Food Stores 1.35 
55 Automative Dealers & Service Stations 2.6 
56 Apparel & Accessory Stores 3.74 
57 Furniture & Homefurnishing Store 1.45 
58 Eating & Drinking Places 0.52 
59 Miscellaneous Retail 5.09 
62 Security & Commodity Brokers 0.83 
72 Personal Services 1.66 
73 Business Services 0.52 
78 Motion Pictures 0.31 
80 Amusement & Recreation Services 0.42 










Obs. Mean Std Median p25 p75 
       
Interest Spread 463 164.654 142.318 150.000 55.000 225.000 
Post 463 0.378 0.485 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Leveraget-1 463 0.248 0.230 0.215 0.089 0.343 
Logassetst-1 463 7.519 1.815 7.477 6.373 8.548 
Tangibilityt-1 463 0.208 0.147 0.157 0.098 0.273 
Profitabilyt-1 463 0.158 0.097 0.146 0.112 0.208 
MTBt-1 463 2.247 1.306 1.845 1.343 2.774 
Zscoret-1 463 2.140 1.158 1.962 1.503 2.891 
Cashflowt 
Volatilityt-1 463 0.058 0.030 0.054 0.039 0.070 
Log Maturityt 463 3.627 0.735 4.078 3.258 4.094 
LogFacilityt 
Amountt 
463 19.261 1.700 19.432 18.421 20.330 
Performancet 
Pricingt 
463 0.518 0.500 1.000 0.000 1.000 
Credit Spreadt 463 1.032 0.370 0.920 0.830 1.160 


















Table 4 Effect of product recall on the Cost of Debt Financing 
 














-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
All 
indrawn(bps) 
134.599 173.08 135.192 136.439 189.837 162.36 173.34 149.44 186.77 -37.32*** 
                    
This table reports the bank interest spread response to the announcement of product recalls for firms involved in product recalls. It reports the univariate analysis  








Table 5  
Multivariate Analysis on the Effect of Product Recall on the Cost of Debt 
Financing 
 
VARIABLES Coefficient   T-Stat 
Post 37.649***   (3.09) 
   
Firm Characteristics   
Leveraget-1 210.648***   (3.289) 
Sizet-1 -21.271***   (-2.657) 
Tangibilityt-1 -12.275   (0.198) 
Profitabilityt-1 -356.404***   (-4.298) 
MTBt-1 -3.056   (-0.828) 
Altmant-1 -19.604**   (-0.329) 
Cash Flow Volatilityt-1 269.068   (0.71) 
   
Loan Characteristics   
Log Loan Maturityt 21.4932   (-1.166) 
Log Loan Amountt -8.2212   (-0.622) 
Performance Pricingt -25.435**   (-2.301) 
 
 Macroeconomic Characteristics 
Credit Spreadt 47.0334***   (6.009) 
Term Spreadt 27.3955***   (4.045) 
  
 
Control for    
Loan Typet      Yes  
Loan Purposet     Yes  
Industry Dummy     Yes  
Constant 293.1007*** (1.637) 
   
No of Observations 472  
Adjusted R-squared 0.622   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: This table reports the bank interest spread response to the announcement of product recall for firms involved 
in product recalls. The dependent variable is interest spread. The independent variable Post is set equal to one if 
the loan initiation is after the product recall date, and zero otherwise. All the right-hand side variables are 
measured at the end of the fiscal year preceding the initiation of each loan facility. The variable definitions for all 
the variables can be found in Appendix A. All the continuous variables are winsorised at the 1% level in both tails. 
Robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses, based on robust standard errors clustered at both the firm and year 




Table 6  
Effects of Product Recall on the Cost of Debt Financing and Corporate 
Governance 
 
Variables Coefficient T-Stat 
Post  197.78** (2.246) 
Independence of BOD 13.631 (0.018) 
Post*Independence of BOD -80.395* (-1.903) 
   
Firm Characteristics   
Leveraget-1 170.473** (2.116) 
Sizet-1 1.379 (0.112) 
Tangibilityt-1 6.126 (0.075) 
Profitabilityt-1 -438.51*** (-4.1) 
MTBt-1 -10.079 (-1.239) 
Altmant-1 1.775 (-0.114) 
Cash Flow Volatilityt-1 -247.984 (-0.693) 
   
Loan Characteristics   
Log Loan Maturityt 7.205 (0.389) 
Log Loan Amountt -30.513 (-1.47) 
Performance Pricingt   -39.509** (-2.054) 
 
 Macroeconomic Characteristics 
Credit Spreadt 5.731 (0.154) 
Term Spreadt   38.325*** (3.716) 
 
 
 Control for  
Loan Typet  Yes  
Loan Purposet Yes  
Industry Dummy Yes  
Constant 657.185 (1.626) 
   
No of Observations 170  
Adjusted R-squared 0.695  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: This table reports the bank interest spread response to lawsuit filings conditional on the quality of firm-level 
corporate governance. The dependent variable is interest spread. The independent variable Post is set equal to one 
if the loan initiation is after the product recall date, and zero otherwise. The quality of corporate governance is 
measured at the end of the year prior to lawsuit filing. The variable independence of BOD is a dummy variable that 
is set to one if the Board Independence is higher than average. All right-hand-side variables are measured at the 
end of the fiscal year preceding the initiation of each loan facility. The variable definitions for all the variables can 
be found in Appendix a. All continuous variables are winsorised at the 1% level in both tails. Robust t-statistics 
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(F-statistics for F-tests) are reported in parentheses, based on robust standard errors clustered at both the firm and 











































Table 7  
Panel A Effects of Product Recall on the Cost of Debt Financing and Ex Ante 
Contract 
  
VARIABLES Coefficient T-Stat 
Post 49.941*** (4.076) 
Ex ante contract    63.009 (0.852) 
Post*Ex ante contract  -57.0273*** (-2.654) 
   
Firm Characteristics   
Leveraget-1 216.495*** (3.269) 
Sizet-1 -20.687*** (-2.758) 
Tangibilityt-1 -0.54 (-0.001) 
Profitabilityt-1 -332.435*** (-4.096) 
MTBt-1 -4.401 (-1.156) 
Altmant-1 -19.721** (-2.119) 
Cash Flow Volatilityt-1   252.639 (0.849) 
   
Loan Characteristics   
Log Loan Maturityt 7.966  (0.595) 
Log Loan Amountt -7.924  (-0.897) 
Performance Pricingt -24.5521***  (-2.178) 
 
 Macroeconomic Characteristics 
Credit Spreadt  43.551***    (5.411) 
Term Spreadt  24.419***    (3.551) 
 
 
 Control for  
Loan Typet  Yes  
Loan Purposet Yes  
Industry Dummyt Yes  
Constant 350.77 (1.947) 
 
  
No of Observations 472  
Adjusted R-squared 0.626   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
This table reports the bank interest spread response to firm’s product recalls conditional on firms’ ex-ante ability to 
recover from product recall.  The dependent variable is interest spread. The independent variable Post is set 
equal to one if the loan initiation is after the product recall date, and zero otherwise.  The firm’s ex-ante ability to 
recover from product recall is measured by the variable Ex-Ante Contract. The variable Ex-Ante Contract is equal 
to one if firms are a manufacturer (NAICS codes31–33) that produce differentiated products based on the 
classification scheme of Rauch (1999), and 0 otherwise. All the other variables are defined in Appendix A. All the 
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continuous variables are winsorised at the 1% level in both tails. Robust t-statistics (F-statistics for F-tests) are 
reported in parentheses, based on robust standard errors clustered at both the firm and year levels. The superscripts 











































Table 8   
Effect of Product Recall on the Cost of Debt Financing: Propensity Scoring 
Matching Sample 
 
VARIABLES  Coefficient       T-Stat 
   Post     -1.806 (-0.173) 
 Recall Firm    -12.38 (-1.116) 
Post* Recall Firm    38.250** (2.54) 
   
Firm Characteristics   
  Leveraget-1    88.048*** (2.217) 
   Sizet-1    -17.473*** (-3.319) 
 Tangibilityt-1    64.615 (-0.899) 
 Profitabilityt-1    -283.029*** (-2.862) 
   MTBt-1    -1.202 (-0.265) 
  Altmant-1    -20.363*** (-2.861) 
 Cash Flow Volatilityt-1    122.485 (-0.436) 
   
Loan Characteristics   
  Log Loan Maturityt    16.055 (-1.44) 
  Log Loan Amountt    -17.477*** (-2.644) 




  Credit Spreadt    34.511*** (2.928) 
  Term Spreadt    17.893*** (3.185) 
 
  
 Control for  
  Loan Typet       Yes  
  Loan Purposet      Yes  
  Industry Dummy      Yes  
  Constant      443*** -2.97 
   
No of Observations      778  
 Adjusted R-squared     0.682   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
This table reports the bank interest spread response to the announcement of product recalls for the sample of recall 
firms and their corresponding control firms based on the PSM approach documented in Appendix A. The 
definitions for variables can be found in Appendix A. The dependent variable is interest spread. The independent 
variable Post is set equal to one if the loan initiation is after the product recall date, and zero otherwise. The 
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independent variable Recall Firms is equal to one if firm is involved in a product recall during the sample period, 0 
otherwise. All right-hand-side variables are measured at the end of the fiscal year preceding the initiation of each 
loan facility. The variable definitions for all the variables can be found in Appendix A. All continuous variables 
are winsorised at the 1% level in both tails. Robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses based on robust standard 
errors clustered at both the firm and year levels. The superscripts *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 







































Table 9  












Post -1.413** 0.1666**   -0.476*** 
 (-2.279) (2.48)   (-3.434) 
Recall Firm             -2.01*** 0.02    0.145 
 (-3.038) (0.33)    (0.914) 
Post*Recall Firm 1.414* -0.15*    0.261* 
 1.664 (-1.83)    (1.668) 
Firm Characteristics    
Leveraget-1 8.600*** 0.0029     0.209 
 (2.966) (0.02)    (0.579) 
Sizet-1 -1.159*** -0.006    -0.416***  
 (-4.183) (-0.22)    (-6.707) 
Tangibilityt-1 -2.509 -0.18    -1.271** 
 (-1.6031) (-0.73)    (-2.134) 
Profitabilityt-1 -13.862*** 1.1***    -0.716* 
 (-3.148) (2.59)    (-1.826) 
MTBt-1 -0.115 0.018    -0.156**  
 (-0.329) (0.65)    (-2.455) 
Altmant-1 -0.2788 -0.04     0.008 
 (-0.946) (-1.33)    (0.104) 
CashFlow 
Volatilityt-1 
26.661*** -1.412     -5.645** 
 (2.993) (-1.31)     (-2.379) 
Loan Characteristics    
Log Loan Maturityt 0.9897***      -0.097 
 2.74      (-0.99) 
Log Deal Amountt -0.7005*** 0.0582***      0.31*** 
 (-2.602) (2.26)     (5.508) 
Performance Pricingt -1.8647*** 0.028     1.094*** 
 (-2.602) (0.505)     (11.407) 
Macroeconomic Characteristics   
Credit Spreadt 0.4127 -0.0668      -0.079 
 (-0.931) (-1.08)      (-0.646) 
Term Spreadt 0.1412 -0.037*      0.013 
 (-0.617) (-1.9)      (0.299) 
Control for     
Loan Typet  Yes Yes       Yes 
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Loan Purposet Yes Yes     Yes 
Industry Dummy Yes Yes     Yes 
Constant 19.917*** -29.69    -1.196 
 4.207 (-1.617)    (-1.094) 
No of Observations 234 652     510 
Adjusted R-squared   0.706     0.371 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
This table shows the logit regression/ ordinary least squares (OLS)/Poisson results for the non-pricing terms of 
bank loans on the announcement of product recall using the propensity score-matched sample. All the variables are 
defined in Appendix A. All continuous variables are winsorised at the 1% level in both tails. All the variables are 
defined in Appendix A. The dependent variable Collateral is a dummy variable taking the value of one if the loan 
is secured by collateral, and zero otherwise. The dependent variable Number of Covenants is measured by the total 
number of general and financial covenants of a loan.  The dependent variable Log Loan maturity is the log value 
of loan terms measured in months. The robust standard errors are clustered at both the firm and year levels, as 
suggested by Petersen (2009) and Gow et al. (2010), except for the Poisson regression for Number of covenants, 





























Table 10 Effect of Frequency on the Interest Spread 
 
VARIABLES Coefficient T-Stat Coefficient T-Stat 
     
Single Recall 51.236*** -3.128   
Mutiple Recalls   25.411** -2.442 
     
Firm Characteristics     
Leveraget-1 344.790*** (-3.336) 302.273*** (-2.913) 
Sizet-1 -23.218* (-1.915) -22.994** (-2.071) 
Tangibilityt-1 -36.392 (-0.438) -36.23 (-0.468) 
Profitabilityt-1 -439.837*** (-3.030) -499.056*** (-5.114) 
MTBt-1 -1.768 (-0.276) 5.443 (-0.943) 
Altmant-1 -8.465 (-0.410) -9.854 (-0.652) 
Cash Flow Volatilityt-1 237.812 (-0.599) 424.797 (-1.57) 
     
Loan Characteristics     
Log Loan Maturityt 10.261 -0.487 7.3038 (-0.428) 
Log Loan Amountt -9.68 (-0.614) -8.605 (-0.585) 




Macroeconomic Characteristics   
Credit Spreadt 30.476 (-1.573) 35.151** (-2.554) 
Term Spreadt 16.813 (-1.621) 22.720*** (-2.843) 
   
  
Control for    
Loan Typet  Yes  Yes  
Loan Purposet Yes  Yes  
Industry Dummyt Yes  Yes  
Constant 507.894* (-1.937) 465.838* (-1.948) 
     
No of Observations 313  392  
Adjusted R-squared 0.6483   0.6434   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
This table reports the bank interest spread response to the announcement of firm’s product recalls. The dependent 
variable is interest spread. The independent variable Single Recall which represents the post period for firms 
encountering product recall only once. The independent variable Multiple recalls is measured as the number of 
years in which there were occurrence of product recalls. All the other variables are defined in Appendix A. All the 
continuous variables are winsorised at the 1% level in both tails. Robust t-statistics (F-statistics for F-tests) are 
reported in parentheses, based on robust standard errors clustered at both the firm and year levels. The superscripts 




Table 11 Effect of Product Recall and Interest Spread in Medical Industry 
 
VARIABLES Coefficient   T-Stat 
Post -14.873 (-0.652) 
   
Firm Characteristics  
Leveraget-1 128.930** (-2.089) 
Sizet-1 -27.976*** (-2.582) 
Tangibilityt-1 -76.464 (-0.646) 
Profitabilityt-1 -221.649 (-1.039) 
MTBt-1 -5.881 (-0.677) 
Altmant-1 -26.337 (-1.5102) 
Cash Flow Volatilityt-1 673.569 (-0.940) 
   
Loan Characteristics  
Log Loan Maturityt  25.544  (-0.828) 
Log Loan Amountt  -4.23  (-1.053) 
Performance Pricingt  -23.533  (-1.006) 
 
 Macroeconomic Characteristics 
Credit Spreadt  3.469  (-0.198) 
Term Spreadt  14.144  (-0.985) 
  
 
Control for    
Loan Typet     Yes  
Loan Purposet    Yes  
Industry Dummy    No  
Constant  340.777***   (-6.385) 
 
  
No of Observations     83  
Adjusted R-squared   0.799   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
This table reports the bank interest spread response to the announcement of product recall for firms involved in 
product recalls in the medical industry. The dependent variable is interest spread. The independent variable Post is 
set equal to one if the loan initiation is after the product recall date, and zero otherwise. All the right-hand side 
variables are measured at the end of the fiscal year preceding the initiation of each loan facility. The variable 
definitions for all the variables can be found in Appendix A. All the continuous variables are winsorised at the 1% 
level in both tails. Robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses, based on robust standard errors clustered at both 








          Chapter 5.  Conclusion  
 
 Product harm crises have emerged as a major societal and economic issue, with some 
arising from the death of several people and leading to the bankruptcy of the firm at the center 
of the controversy. The recent bankruptcy announcement of Japanese airbag manufacturer 
Takata Corporation illustrates the potential implications of such crises. However, most prior 
studies on product harm crises focus on their marketing implications. In contrast, my studies 
examine this important business phenomenon from the angles of accounting, corporate 
governance, and debt contracting. Several contributions and implications arise from the three 
essays.  
First, results suggest that CEOs’ risk-taking preferences, combined with their lack of 
experience in production and operation management, are significantly associated with product 
safety issues. Board of directors may, therefore, consider increasing the proportion of directors 
with expertise in the industry to fill the void of managers’ experience, so that the board of 
directors can better monitor and advise the CEO in the area of production, to align the CEO’s 
incentive with shareholders, and to encourage investment in product quality.  
Second, findings contained in the dissertation inform investors, auditors, creditors, and 
other stakeholders of the implication of product harm crises on a firm’s financial reporting 
activities. Prior studies illustrate the various marketing strategies a firm can take to rescue its 
reputation and regain customer confidence. The studies contained in the dissertation 
complement such work by informing managers that firms projecting a strong financial 
performance in the crisis year can also reduce the likelihood of losing customers, especially 







Thirdly, the dissertation findings are informative about the financial costs induced by 
product recalls. Although a product recall can cause significant adverse costs to firms, some 
studies argue and find that investors may consider product recalls as a part of the normal cost 
of conducting business. Focusing on new bank loans in the period following the product recall 
event, my dissertation also reports that product recalls can cause financial losses in terms of 
higher interest spreads.  
The studies presented in this dissertation are subject to some limitations. First, I restrict 
my sample to US-listed firms. Further research is needed to confirm the generalizability of my 
findings to private firms and non-US firms. Secondly, my sample focuses on the manufacturing 
industries which are largely regulated by CPSC and FDA. Future research can extend my study 
by investigating other important industry areas, such as service sectors. Thirdly, while my 
dissertation finds that CEO characteristics can influence product harm crises, future research 
can provide more insights by investigating the mechanism through which CEOs affect the 
product quality. There are several possibilities, such as cutting down process controls, quality 
standards, and employee bonuses. Exploring these mediating processes could be a promising 
avenue for future research. Fourthly, while my dissertation documents that managers use 
upward earnings management to rescue reputation and alleviate personal costs involved in the 
product harm crises, future researchers can examine whether managers also use optimistic 
management earnings forecast during the crisis year along with the upward earnings 
management to attain the same objective. Anecdotal evidence often shows that firms often 
announce very optimistic earnings forecasts in the year of a product harm crisis.   
